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Speculation and the Decision to Abandon a Fixed Exchange Rate Regime

  • Ivan Pastine

    (Bilkent University)

This paper investigates the extent to which it is possible for speculative attacks to be predictable given information on economic fundamentals. A standard model of predictable attacks is extended to incorporate an optimizing monetary authority. It is shown that while incorporating a forward-looking monetary authority improves our understanding of many observed phenomena, it also implies that the branch of the literature that places emphasis on predictable movements in fundamentals cannot generate predictable speculative attacks. In addition, the model provides useful insights into the viability of temporary nominal anchor policies, and a theoretical foundation for an important empirical methodology.

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Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers with number 0931.

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Date of creation: 01 Aug 2000
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:wc2000:0931
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  1. Robert P. Flood & Peter M. Garber & Charles Kramer, 1995. "Collapsing Exchange Rate Regimes: Another Linear Example," NBER Working Papers 5318, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Leo K. Simon and Maxwell B. Stinchcombe., 1987. "Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies," Economics Working Papers 8746, University of California at Berkeley.
  3. Morris, S & Song Shin, H, 1996. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," Economics Papers 126, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  4. F Gulcin Ozkan & Alan Sutherland, . "A Model of the ERM Crisis," Discussion Papers 94/2, Department of Economics, University of York.
  5. Blackburn, Keith & Sola, Martin, 1993. " Speculative Currency Attacks and Balance of Payments Crises," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(2), pages 119-44, June.
  6. Stephen W. Salant & Dale W. Henderson, 1976. "Market anticipations, government policy, and the price of gold," International Finance Discussion Papers 81, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  7. Maurice Obstfeld, 1984. "Rational and Self-Fulfilling Balance-of-Payments Crises," NBER Working Papers 1486, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Velasco, Andres, 1994. "Are Balance of Payments Crises Rational?," Working Papers 94-08, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  9. Jeanne, Olivier, 1997. "Are currency crises self-fulfilling?: A test," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3-4), pages 263-286, November.
  10. Benabou, Roland, 1989. "Optimal Price Dynamics and Speculation with a Storable Good," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(1), pages 41-80, January.
  11. Ozkan, F. Gulcin & Sutherland, Alan, 1998. "A currency crisis model with an optimising policymaker," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 339-364, April.
  12. Ozkan, F Gulcin & Sutherland, Alan, 1995. "Policy Measures to Avoid a Currency Crisis," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(429), pages 510-19, March.
  13. Flood, Robert P. & Garber, Peter M., 1984. "Collapsing exchange-rate regimes : Some linear examples," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 1-13, August.
  14. Krugman, Paul, 1979. "A Model of Balance-of-Payments Crises," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 11(3), pages 311-25, August.
  15. Pierre-Richard Agénor & Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Robert P. Flood, 1992. "Speculative Attacks and Models of Balance of Payments Crises," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 39(2), pages 357-394, June.
  16. Robert P. Flood & Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Pierre-Richard Agénor, 1991. "Speculative Attacks and Models of Balance of Payments Crises," IMF Working Papers 91/99, International Monetary Fund.
  17. Salant, Stephen W & Henderson, Dale W, 1978. "Market Anticipations of Government Policies and the Price of Gold," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(4), pages 627-48, August.
  18. Ivan Pastine, 2000. "Devaluation of fixed exchange rates: optimal strategy in the presence of speculation," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 631-661.
  19. Nancy P. Marion & Robert P. Flood, 1998. "Perspectiveson the Recent Currency Crisis Literature," IMF Working Papers 98/130, International Monetary Fund.
  20. Velasco, Andres, 1997. "When are fixed exchange rates really fixed?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 5-25, October.
  21. Robert P. Flood & Peter M. Garber, 1981. "Gold monetization and gold discipline," International Finance Discussion Papers 190, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  22. Pablo E. Guidotti & Carlos A. Végh, 1997. "Losing Credibility: The Stabilization Blues," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 122, Universidad del CEMA.
  23. Cole, Harold L. & Kehoe, Timothy J., 1996. "A self-fulfilling model of Mexico's 1994-1995 debt crisis," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-4), pages 309-330, November.
  24. Andersen, Torben M, 1994. "Shocks and the Viability of a Fixed Exchange Rate Commitment," CEPR Discussion Papers 969, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  25. Davies, Gareth & Vines, David, 1995. "Equilibrium Currency Crises: Are Multiple Equilibria Self-fulfilling or History Dependent?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1239, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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