IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Currency attack/defense with two-sided private information

  • Yuk-shing CHENG
  • Chi-shing CHAN
  • Chor-yiu SIN
Registered author(s):

    A currency attack fails on its own when the speculator suffers from her financial problem. This paper extends the existing models and argues that the monetary authority?s willingness to peg and the speculator?s cost of attack are private information. Our model thus accounts for the duration of currency attack/defense, and more importantly, allows for failed attack. We employ an asymmetric war of attrition and gauge the time when the speculator stops attacking, or when the monetary authority de-pegs. Comparative static results throw light on the interest rate policy amidst the Exchange Rate Mechanism Crisis and the Asian Currency Crisis

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://repec.org/esFEAM04/up.12549.1070703691.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings with number 395.

    as
    in new window

    Length:
    Date of creation: 11 Aug 2004
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ecm:feam04:395
    Contact details of provider: Phone: 1 212 998 3820
    Fax: 1 212 995 4487
    Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/pastmeetings.asp
    Email:


    More information through EDIRC

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Anne Jansen & Donald J. Mathieson & Barry J. Eichengreen & Laura E. Kodres & Bankim Chadha & Sunil Sharma, 1998. "Hedge Funds and Financial Market Dynamics," IMF Occasional Papers 166, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Alesina, Alberto & Drazen, Allan, 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1170-88, December.
    3. Corsetti, G. & Pesenti, P. & Roubini, N., 1998. "What Caused the Asian Currency and Financial Crisis?," Papers 343, Banca Italia - Servizio di Studi.
    4. Allan Drazen & Paul R. Masson, 1993. "Credibility of Policies versus Credibility of Policymakers," NBER Working Papers 4448, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Fernando Broner, 1999. "On the timing of balance of payments crises: Disaggregated information and interest rate policy," Economics Working Papers 840, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Feb 2002.
    6. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1986. "Rational and Self-fulfilling Balance-of-Payments Crises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(1), pages 72-81, March.
    7. Flood, Robert & Marion, Nancy, 1997. "The size and timing of devaluations in capital-controlled economies," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 123-147, October.
    8. Hyun Song Shin & Giancarlo Corsetti & Amil Dasgupta & Stephen Morris, 2001. "Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders," FMG Discussion Papers dp372, Financial Markets Group.
    9. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1996. "Models of currency crises with self-fulfilling features," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 1037-1047, April.
    10. Ozkan, F. Gulcin & Sutherland, Alan, 1998. "A currency crisis model with an optimising policymaker," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 339-364, April.
    11. Christophe Chamley, 2003. "Dynamic Speculative Attacks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 603-621, June.
    12. Kraay, Aart, 2000. "Do high interest rates defend currencies during speculative attacks ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2267, The World Bank.
    13. Botman, Dennis P. J. & Jager, Henk, 2002. "Coordination of speculation," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 159-175, October.
    14. Ivan Pastine, 2000. "Speculation and the Decision to Abandon a Fixed Exchange Rate Regime," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0931, Econometric Society.
    15. Maurice Obstfeld & Kenneth Rogoff, 1995. "The Mirage of Fixed Exchange Rates," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 73-96, Fall.
    16. Bensaid, Bernard & Jeanne, Olivier, 1997. "The instability of fixed exchange rate systems when raising the nominal interest rate is costly," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(8), pages 1461-1478, August.
    17. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "A Theory of Exit in Duopoly," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 943-60, July.
    18. Michael W. Klein & Nancy P. Marion, 1994. "Explaining the Duration of Exchange-Rate Pegs," NBER Working Papers 4651, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Grilli, Vittorio, 1990. "Managing exchange rate crises: evidence from the 1890s," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 258-275, September.
    20. Krugman, Paul, 1979. "A Model of Balance-of-Payments Crises," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 11(3), pages 311-25, August.
    21. Allsopp, Louise, 2000. "A Model to Explain the Duration of a Currency Crisis," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 5(4), pages 331-37, October.
    22. Drazen, Allan, 2000. "Interest-rate and borrowing defense against speculative attack," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 303-348, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecm:feam04:395. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.