IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Shadow rates and multiple equilibria in the theory of currency crises


  • Cavallari, Lilia
  • Corsetti, Giancarlo


No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Cavallari, Lilia & Corsetti, Giancarlo, 2000. "Shadow rates and multiple equilibria in the theory of currency crises," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 275-286, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:inecon:v:51:y:2000:i:2:p:275-286

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Velasco, Andres, 1997. "When are fixed exchange rates really fixed?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 5-25, October.
    2. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1996. "Models of currency crises with self-fulfilling features," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 1037-1047, April.
    3. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1986. "Rational and Self-fulfilling Balance-of-Payments Crises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(1), pages 72-81, March.
    4. Stephen W. Salant & Dale W. Henderson, 1976. "Market anticipations, government policy, and the price of gold," International Finance Discussion Papers 81, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    5. Buiter, Willem H. & Corsetti, Giancarlo & Pesenti, Paolo, 1996. "Interpreting the ERM Crisis: Country-Specific and Systemic Issues," CEPR Discussion Papers 1466, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Bensaid, Bernard & Jeanne, Olivier, 1997. "The instability of fixed exchange rate systems when raising the nominal interest rate is costly," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(8), pages 1461-1478, August.
    7. Allan Drazen & Paul R. Masson, 1994. "Credibility of Policies Versus Credibility of Policymakers," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 109(3), pages 735-754.
    8. Krugman, Paul, 1979. "A Model of Balance-of-Payments Crises," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 11(3), pages 311-325, August.
    9. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1997. "Destabilizing effects of exchange-rate escape clauses," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1-2), pages 61-77, August.
    10. Flood, Robert & Marion, Nancy, 1999. "Perspectives on the Recent Currency Crisis Literature," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 4(1), pages 1-26, January.
    11. Paul Krugman, 1996. "Are Currency Crises Self-Fulfilling?," NBER Chapters,in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1996, Volume 11, pages 345-407 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Ozkan, F. Gulcin & Sutherland, Alan, 1998. "A currency crisis model with an optimising policymaker," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 339-364, April.
    13. Buiter, Willem H., 1987. "Borrowing to defend the exchange rate and the timing and magnitude of speculative attacks," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 221-239, November.
    14. Maurice Obstfeld & Kenneth Rogoff, 1995. "The Mirage of Fixed Exchange Rates," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 73-96, Fall.
    15. Flood, Robert P. & Garber, Peter M., 1984. "Collapsing exchange-rate regimes : Some linear examples," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 1-13, August.
    16. Maurice Obstfeld, 1994. "The Logic of Currency Crises," NBER Working Papers 4640, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Robert P. Flood & Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Jocelyn P. Horne, 1989. "Evolution of Exchange Rate Regimes," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 36(4), pages 810-835, December.
    18. Robert P. Flood & Nancy P. Marion, 1996. "Speculative Attacks: Fundamentals and Self-Fulfilling Prophecies," NBER Working Papers 5789, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Mackowiak, Bartosz, 2006. "Fiscal imbalances and the dynamics of currency crises," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(5), pages 1317-1338, July.
    2. Broner, Fernando A., 2008. "Discrete devaluations and multiple equilibria in a first generation model of currency crises," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 592-605, April.
    3. Paolo Canofari & Giancarlo Marini & Giovanni Piersanti, 2012. "The Sustainability of Monetary Unions. Can the Euro Survive?," CEIS Research Paper 226, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 27 Mar 2012.
    4. SAWADA Yasuyuki & Pan A. YOTOPOULOS, 2001. "Currency Substitution, Speculation and Crises: Theory and Empirical Analysis," ESRI Discussion paper series 007, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI).
    5. Yasuyuki Swada & Pan A. Yotopoulos, 2005. "Corner Solutions, Crises, and Capital Controls: A Theory and an Empirical Analyas on the Optimal Exchane Rate Regime in Emerging Economies," Discussion Papers 04-037, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    6. Paolo Canofari & Giancarlo Marini & Giovanni Piersanti, 2014. "Measuring Currency Pressure and Contagion Risks in Countries under Monetary Unions: The Case of Euro," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 42(4), pages 455-469, December.
    7. Paolo Canofari & Giancarlo Marini & Giovanni Piersanti, 2015. "Expectations and systemic risk in EMU government bond spreads," Quantitative Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(4), pages 711-724, April.
    8. Delphine Lahet, 2001. "L'occurrence d'une crise financière dans un modèle de troisième génération," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 16(2), pages 179-206.
    9. repec:eee:reecon:v:71:y:2017:i:3:p:373-383 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:inecon:v:51:y:2000:i:2:p:275-286. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.