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Interpreting the ERM Crisis: Country-Specific and Systemic Issues

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  • Buiter, Willem H.
  • Corsetti, Giancarlo
  • Pesenti, Paolo

Abstract

Most interpretations of the Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis of 1992/3 ignore the key role played by structural policy spillovers among European countries, and overlook the effects of coordination (or lack thereof) of monetary and exchange rate policies among the countries making up the periphery of the system. This paper provides a simple analytical framework, able to encompass the recent literature on currency crises, while developing it by bringing out the decisive role of the strategic interactions among national policy-makers in a multi-country monetary and exchange rate game. In contrast to an approach that focuses exclusively on country-specific issues, a systemic view is ultimately able to unravel more coherently, and more convincingly, the ‘puzzles’ of the ERM crisis.

Suggested Citation

  • Buiter, Willem H. & Corsetti, Giancarlo & Pesenti, Paolo, 1996. "Interpreting the ERM Crisis: Country-Specific and Systemic Issues," CEPR Discussion Papers 1466, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1466
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    ERM; Monetary Policy Coordination; Systemic Crises;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange
    • F32 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Current Account Adjustment; Short-term Capital Movements
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics
    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission

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