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Is There a Safe Passage to EMU? Evidence on Capital Controls and a Proposal

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  • Eichengreen, Barry
  • Rose, Andrew K
  • Wyplosz, Charles

Abstract

This paper provides evidence on the effects of capital controls. We show that controls have been associated with significant differences in macroeconomic behaviour, especially in monetary policy. While they have not prevented speculative attacks, they have provided the breathing space needed to organize orderly realignments. We also provide evidence on the channels through which speculative attacks operate, showing that bank lending to non-residents is a key transmission mechanism. We conclude with a discussion of measures that mimic some of the effects of controls as a way of easing the transition to European Monetary Union. Non-interest-bearing deposit requirements on lending to non-residents are proposed as a third-best route to monetary union.

Suggested Citation

  • Eichengreen, Barry & Rose, Andrew K & Wyplosz, Charles, 1994. "Is There a Safe Passage to EMU? Evidence on Capital Controls and a Proposal," CEPR Discussion Papers 1061, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1061
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    Cited by:

    1. Eichengreen, Barry & Rose, Andrew K & Wyplosz, Charles, 1994. "Speculative Attacks on Pegged Exchange Rates: An Empirical Exploration with Special Reference to the European Monetary System," CEPR Discussion Papers 1060, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Straetmans, Stefan T.M. & Versteeg, Roald J. & Wolff, Christian C.P., 2013. "Are capital controls in the foreign exchange market effective?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 36-53.
    3. Ramkishen Rajan, 1998. "Restraints On Capital Flows : What Are They?," Macroeconomics Working Papers 22383, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
    4. C. E. Weller, 2001. "Financial Crises After Financial Liberalisation: Exceptional Circumstances or Structural Weakness?," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 38(1), pages 98-127.
    5. Eichengreen, Barry & Tobin, James & Wyplosz, Charles, 1995. "Two Cases for Sand in the Wheels of International Finance," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(428), pages 162-172, January.
    6. Kenen, Peter B., 1995. "What have we learned from the EMS crises?," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 449-461, October.
    7. Michael Melvin & Frank Westermann, 2022. "Chinese Exchange Rate Policy: Lessons for Global Investors," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(1), pages 145-168, February.
    8. Barry Eichengreen and Charles Wyplosz., 1995. "What Do Currency Crises Tell Us About the Future of the International Monetary System?," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C95-057, University of California at Berkeley.
    9. Benoît Cœuré & Antoine Magnier, 1996. "Crédibilité et fondamentaux macro-économiques au sein du SME : un examen empirique," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 123(2), pages 113-146.
    10. Schnatz, Bernd, 1998. "Macroeconomic determinants of currency turbulences in emerging markets," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 1998,03e, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    11. Mariassunta Giannetti, 2004. "Old and Modern Currency Crises: Short-Term Liabilities, Speculative Attacks and Business Cycles," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 133, Econometric Society.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange
    • F32 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Current Account Adjustment; Short-term Capital Movements

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