Financial Crises After Financial Liberalisation: Exceptional Circumstances or Structural Weakness?
In this article, I argue that emerging economies are systematically becoming more susceptible to both currency and banking crises after financial liberalisation (FL). Using data for 27 emerging economies from 1973 to 1998, univariate and multivariate analyses indicate that the likelihood of currency crises and banking crises increase after FL. In particular, liberalisation allows more liquidity to enter an emerging economy, which finds its way into productive and speculative projects. What is common to both types of crises is a significant increase in speculative financing, thereby increasing the chance for borrower default. Thus, the outflow of international capital becomes more likely. The chance of a crisis occurring in response to changes in short-term loans is greater after FL than before. Similarly, the chance of a currency crisis occurring following a currency overvaluation is larger after FL than before. In comparison, the likelihood of a banking crisis occurring in response to an overvalued currency remains the same. Finally, the results show that the chance of a currency crisis declines over time, while the chance of a banking crisis increases after FL.
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Volume (Year): 38 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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