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What Do Currency Crises Tell Us About the Future of the International Monetary System?

  • Barry Eichengreen and Charles Wyplosz.

In this paper we review what is known about exchange rate crises. We then draw out lessons for the choice of exchange rate regime. We show the dilemmas of exchange rate management are particularly acute for small, open developing economies. Freely floating exchange rates are not tolerable for such countries because their markets are thin, their exchange rates would be volatile, and their trade and production would be severely disrupted. But fixed exchange rates are not viable either because they would be highly susceptible to destabilizing speculative attack.

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Paper provided by University of California at Berkeley in its series Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers with number C95-057.

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Date of creation: 01 Oct 1995
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Handle: RePEc:ucb:calbcd:c95-057
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  1. F Gulcin Ozkan & Alan Sutherland, . "A Model of the ERM Crisis," Discussion Papers 94/2, Department of Economics, University of York.
  2. Stein, Ernesto & Streb, Jorge, 1994. "Political Stabilization Cycles in High Inflation Economies," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers 233383, University of California-Berkeley, Department of Economics.
  3. Eichengreen, Barry & Tobin, James & Wyplosz, Charles, 1995. "Two Cases for Sand in the Wheels of International Finance," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(428), pages 162-72, January.
  4. Richard Baldwin, 1988. "Hysteresis In Import Prices: The Beachhead Effect," NBER Working Papers 2545, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Obstfeld, Maurice & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1994. "The Intertemporal Approach to the Current Account," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers 233395, University of California-Berkeley, Department of Economics.
  6. Barry Eichengreen and Beth Simmons., 1993. "International Economics and Domestic Politics: Notes on the 1920s," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C93-029, University of California at Berkeley.
  7. Tamim Bayoumi and Barry Eichengreen., 1994. "The Stability of the Gold Standard and the Evolution of the International Monetary System," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C94-040, University of California at Berkeley.
  8. Ernesto H. Stein & Jorge M. Streb, 1997. "Political Stabilization Cycles in High Inflation Economies," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 123, Universidad del CEMA.
  9. Tamim Bayoumi and Barry Eichengreen., 1993. "One Money or Many? On Analyzing the Prospects for Monetary Unification in Various Parts of the World," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C93-030, University of California at Berkeley.
  10. Barry Eichengreen and Jurgen von Hagen., 1995. "Fiscal Policy and Monetary Union: Federalism, Fiscal Restrictions and the No-Bailout Rule," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C95-056, University of California at Berkeley.
  11. Maurice Obstfeld, 1994. "The Logic of Currency Crises," NBER Working Papers 4640, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Eichengreen, Barry & von Hagen, Jurgen, 1995. "Fiscal Policy and Monetary Union: Federalism, Fiscal Restrictions and the No-Bailout Rule," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers 233417, University of California-Berkeley, Department of Economics.
  13. Frankel, Jeffrey A & Rose, Andrew K, 1995. "A Panel Project on Purchasing Power Parity: Mean Reversion Within and Between Countries," CEPR Discussion Papers 1128, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. Bayoumi, Tamim & Eichengreen, Barry, 1994. "The Stability of the Gold Standard and the Evolution of the International Monetary System," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers 233389, University of California-Berkeley, Department of Economics.
  15. Eichengreen, Barry & Simmons, Beth, 1993. "International Economics and Domestic Politics: Notes on the 1920s," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers 233212, University of California-Berkeley, Department of Economics.
  16. Bayoumi, Tamim & Eichengreen, Barry, 1993. "One Money or Many? On Analyzing the Prospects for Monetary Unification in Various Parts of the World," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers 233213, University of California-Berkeley, Department of Economics.
  17. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1986. "Rational and Self-fulfilling Balance-of-Payments Crises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(1), pages 72-81, March.
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