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Optimal Dynamic Information Provision

Author

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  • Renault, Jérôme
  • Solan, Eilon
  • Vieille, Nicolas

Abstract

We study a dynamic model of information provision. A state of nature evolves according to a Markov chain. An advisor with commitment power decides how much information to provide to an uninformed decision maker, so as to influence his short-term decisions. We deal with a stylized class of situations, in which the decision maker has a risky action and a safe action, and the payoff to the advisor only depends on the action chosen by the decision maker. The greedy disclosure policy is the policy which, at each round, minimizes the amount of information being disclosed in that round, under the constraint that it maximizes the current payoff of the advisor. We prove that the greedy policy is optimal in many cases – but not always.

Suggested Citation

  • Renault, Jérôme & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2017. "Optimal Dynamic Information Provision," TSE Working Papers 17-749, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:31316
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    1. repec:eee:phsmap:v:506:y:2018:i:c:p:424-432 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. repec:eee:apmaco:v:330:y:2018:i:c:p:125-133 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. repec:eee:apmaco:v:340:y:2019:i:c:p:138-145 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dynamic information provision; optimal strategy; greedy algorithm; commitment;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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