Optimal Dynamic Information Provision
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- Xu, Hedong & Tian, Cunzhi & Ye, Wenxing & Fan, Suohai, 2018. "Effects of investors’ power correlations in the power-based game on networks," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 506(C), pages 424-432.
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More about this item
KeywordsDynamic information provision; optimal strategy; greedy algorithm; commitment;
All these keywords.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-MIC-2017-01-15 (Microeconomics)
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