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On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information

Author

Listed:
  • Nicolas Vieille

    (GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Johannes Hörner

    (Department of Economics - Yale University [New Haven])

  • Dinah Rosenberg

    (GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Eilon Solan

    (TAU - School of Mathematical Sciences [Tel Aviv] - TAU - Raymond and Beverly Sackler Faculty of Exact Sciences [Tel Aviv] - TAU - Tel Aviv University)

Abstract

We apply the average cost optimality equation to zero-sum Markov games by considering a simple game with one-sided incomplete information that generalizes an example of Aumann and Maschler [Aumann, R. J., M. B. Maschler. 1995. Repeated Games with Incomplete Information. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA]. We determine the value and identify the optimal strategies for a range of parameters.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Vieille & Johannes Hörner & Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan, 2010. "On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information," Post-Print hal-00528415, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00528415
    DOI: 10.1287/opre.1100.0829
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2001. "Who Wants a Good Reputation?," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 68(2), pages 415-441.
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    Cited by:

    1. Laraki, Rida & Sorin, Sylvain, 2015. "Advances in Zero-Sum Dynamic Games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    2. Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit & Rainer, Catherine & Solan, Eilon, 2020. "Solving two-state Markov games with incomplete information on one side," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 83-104.
    3. Escobar, Juan F. & Llanes, Gastón, 2018. "Cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 408-443.
    4. Renault, Jérôme & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2013. "Dynamic sender–receiver games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 502-534.
    5. Renault, Jérôme & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2017. "Optimal dynamic information provision," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 329-349.
    6. Kolb, Aaron M., 2015. "Optimal entry timing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 973-1000.

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