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Dinah Dinah Rosenberg

Personal Details

First Name:Dinah
Middle Name:Dinah
Last Name:Rosenberg
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pro1039
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]

Affiliation

HEC Paris (École des Hautes Études Commerciales)

Jouy-en-Josas, France
http://www.hec.fr/

:

78351 Jouy-en-Josas cedex
RePEc:edi:hecpafr (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon & Vieille , Nicolas, 2013. "Strategic Information Exchange," HEC Research Papers Series 1009, HEC Paris.
  2. Rosenberg, Dinah & Salomon , Antoine & Vieille , Nicolas, 2013. "On Games of Strategic Experimentation," HEC Research Papers Series 1008, HEC Paris.
  3. Ehud Lehrer & Dinah Rosenberg & Eran Shmaya, 2013. "Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence," Post-Print hal-01069192, HAL.
  4. Cardaliaguet, Pierre & Rainer, Catherine & Rosenberg, Dinah & Vieille , Nicolas, 2013. "Markov Games with Frequent Actions and Incomplete Information," HEC Research Papers Series 1007, HEC Paris.
  5. Dinah Rosenberg & Ehud Lehrer, 2010. "A Note on the Evaluation of Information in Zero-Sum Repeated Games," Post-Print hal-00537092, HAL.
  6. Dinah Rosenberg & Ehud Lehrer & Eran Shmaya, 2010. "Signaling and mediation in games with common interest," Post-Print hal-00528396, HAL.
  7. Dinah Rosenberg & Johannes Hörner & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2010. "On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information," Post-Print hal-00528398, HAL.
  8. Nicolas Vieille & Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan, 2010. "On the optimal amount of experimentation in sequential decision problems," Post-Print hal-00528414, HAL.
  9. Johannes Horner & Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2009. "On a Markov Game with One-Sided Incomplete Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1737, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  10. Dinah Rosenberg & E. Solan N, 2009. "Protocols with no acknowledgment," Post-Print hal-00491676, HAL.
  11. Nicolas Vieille & Eilon Solan & Dinah Rosenberg, 2009. "Informational externalities and emergence of consensus," Post-Print hal-00464565, HAL.
  12. Bernard De Meyer & Ehud Lehrer & Dinah Rosenberg, 2009. "Evaluating information in zero-sum games with incomplete information on both sides," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 09035, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
  13. Jean-Francois Mertens & Abraham Neyman & Dinah Rosenberg, 2007. "Absorbing Games with Compact Action Spaces," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000178, UCLA Department of Economics.
  14. Nicolas Vieille & Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan, 2007. "Social Learning in One-Arm Bandit Problems," Post-Print hal-00464609, HAL.
  15. Johannes Horner & Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2006. "On A Markov Game with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 1412, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  16. Vieille, Nicolas & Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon, 2006. "Informational externalities and convergence of behavior," HEC Research Papers Series 856, HEC Paris.
  17. Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2004. "Timing Games with Informational Externalities," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000704, David K. Levine.
  18. Dinah Rosenberg & Nicolas Vieille & Eilon Solan, 2004. "Approximating a sequence of observations by a simple process," Post-Print hal-00464946, HAL.
  19. Nicolas Vieille & Eilon Solan & Dinah Rosenberg, 2004. "Stochastic Games with a Single Controller and Incomplete Information," Post-Print hal-00464938, HAL.
  20. Ehud Lehrer & Dinah Rosenberg, 2003. "What restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information?," Game Theory and Information 0312005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  21. Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2003. "The MaxMin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring," Post-Print hal-00464949, HAL.
  22. Ehud Lehrer & Dinah Rosenberg, 2003. "A Wide Range No-Regret Theorem," Game Theory and Information 0312004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  23. Ehud Lehrer & Dinah Rosenberg, 2003. "Information and Its Value in Zero-Sum Repeated Games," Game Theory and Information 0312003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  24. Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2002. "Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Discussion Papers 1341, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  25. Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2002. "Approximating a Sequence of Approximations by a Simple Process," Discussion Papers 1345, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  26. Dinah Rosenberg & Nicolas Vieille & Eilon Solan, 2002. "Blackwell optimality in Markov decision processes with partial observation," Post-Print hal-00464998, HAL.
  27. Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2001. "On the MaxMin Value of Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Working Papers hal-00593645, HAL.
  28. Dinah Rosenberg & Nicolas Vieille & Eilon Solan, 2001. "Stopping games with randomized strategies," Post-Print hal-00465029, HAL.
  29. Nicolas Vieille & Dinah Rosenberg, 2000. "The Maxmin of Recursive Games with Incomplete Information on one Side," Post-Print hal-00481429, HAL.
  30. DE MEYER, Bernard & ROSENBERG, Dinah, 1997. "“Cav u” and the dual game," CORE Discussion Papers 1997048, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

Articles

  1. Rosenberg, Dinah & Salomon, Antoine & Vieille, Nicolas, 2013. "On games of strategic experimentation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 31-51.
  2. Lehrer, Ehud & Rosenberg, Dinah & Shmaya, Eran, 2013. "Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 179-191.
  3. Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2013. "Strategic information exchange," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 444-467.
  4. Lehrer, Ehud & Rosenberg, Dinah, 2010. "A note on the evaluation of information in zero-sum repeated games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 393-399, July.
  5. Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2010. "On the optimal amount of experimentation in sequential decision problems," Statistics & Probability Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(5-6), pages 381-385, March.
  6. Lehrer, Ehud & Rosenberg, Dinah & Shmaya, Eran, 2010. "Signaling and mediation in games with common interests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 670-682, March.
  7. Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2009. "Informational externalities and emergence of consensus," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 979-994, July.
  8. Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2007. "Social Learning in One-Arm Bandit Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(6), pages 1591-1611, November.
  9. Lehrer, Ehud & Rosenberg, Dinah, 2006. "What restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 343-357, June.
  10. Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2003. "The MaxMin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(1), pages 133-150, December.
  11. Dinah Rosenberg, 1998. "Duality and markovian strategies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(4), pages 577-597.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 22 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (14) 1999-05-10 2002-07-04 2002-07-04 2002-12-09 2002-12-09 2003-10-05 2005-12-14 2007-04-09 2007-07-13 2007-11-10 2009-06-17 2009-11-14 2013-12-15 2013-12-15. Author is listed
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (7) 2003-12-14 2003-12-14 2003-12-14 2005-12-14 2006-12-09 2013-12-15 2013-12-15. Author is listed
  3. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (4) 2009-06-17 2009-11-14 2013-12-15 2013-12-15
  4. NEP-HPE: History & Philosophy of Economics (2) 2009-06-17 2013-12-15
  5. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (2) 1999-05-10 2003-09-28
  6. NEP-ORE: Operations Research (2) 2009-11-14 2013-12-15
  7. NEP-RMG: Risk Management (2) 2002-12-09 2002-12-09
  8. NEP-UPT: Utility Models & Prospect Theory (2) 2009-06-03 2009-06-17
  9. NEP-CBE: Cognitive & Behavioural Economics (1) 2006-12-09
  10. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2002-12-09
  11. NEP-ECM: Econometrics (1) 2002-12-11
  12. NEP-ETS: Econometric Time Series (1) 2002-06-13
  13. NEP-ICT: Information & Communication Technologies (1) 2006-12-09
  14. NEP-NET: Network Economics (1) 2006-12-09

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