A note on the evaluation of information in zero-sum repeated games
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- Dinah Rosenberg & Ehud Lehrer, 2010. "A Note on the Evaluation of Information in Zero-Sum Repeated Games," Post-Print hal-00537092, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
- Robert J. Aumann, 1995. "Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262011476, July.
- Hirshleifer, Jack, 1971. "The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 561-574, September.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Tanja Hï¿½rtnagl & Rudolf Kerschbamer, 2014. "How the Value of Information Shapes the Value of Commitment Or: Why the Value of Commitment Does Not Vanish," Working Papers 2014-03, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
- Kloosterman, Andrew, 2015. "Public information in Markov games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 28-48.
- Romulus Breban, 2016. "A mathematical model for a gaming community," Papers 1607.03161, arXiv.org.
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KeywordsRepeated games Zero-sum games Value-of-information;
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