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A note on the evaluation of information in zero-sum repeated games

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  • Lehrer, Ehud
  • Rosenberg, Dinah

Abstract

Two players play a zero-sum repeated game with incomplete information. Before the game starts one player receives a private signal that depends on the realized state of nature. The rules that govern the choice of the signal are determined by the information structure of the game. Different information structures induce different values. The value-of-information function of a game associates every information structure with the value it induces. We characterize those functions that are value-of-information functions for some zero-sum repeated game with incomplete information.

Suggested Citation

  • Lehrer, Ehud & Rosenberg, Dinah, 2010. "A note on the evaluation of information in zero-sum repeated games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 393-399, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:46:y:2010:i:4:p:393-399
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1971. "The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 561-574, September.
    2. Bruno Bassan & Olivier Gossner & Marco Scarsini & Shmuel Zamir, 2003. "Positive value of information in games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(1), pages 17-31, December.
    3. Robert J. Aumann, 1995. "Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262011476, December.
    4. MERTENS, Jean-François & ZAMIR, Shmuel, 1971. "The value of two-person zero-sum repeated games with lack of information on both sides," LIDAM Reprints CORE 154, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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    Cited by:

    1. Tanja Hörtnagl & Rudolf Kerschbamer, 2014. "How the Value of Information Shapes the Value of Commitment Or: Why the Value of Commitment Does Not Vanish," Working Papers 2014-03, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    2. Kloosterman, Andrew, 2015. "Public information in Markov games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 28-48.
    3. Yanling Chang & Alan Erera & Chelsea White, 2015. "Value of information for a leader–follower partially observed Markov game," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 235(1), pages 129-153, December.
    4. Pierre Cardaliaguet & Catherine Rainer & Dinah Rosenberg & Nicolas Vieille, 2016. "Markov Games with Frequent Actions and Incomplete Information—The Limit Case," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 41(1), pages 49-71, February.
    5. Romulus Breban, 2016. "A mathematical model for a gaming community," Papers 1607.03161, arXiv.org.

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