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Positive value of information in games

  • Bruno Bassan


  • Olivier Gossner


  • Marco Scarsini


  • Shmuel Zamir


We exhibit a general class of interactive decision situations in which all the agents benefit from more information. This class includes as a special case the classical comparison of statistical experiments à la Blackwell. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2003

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Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Games Theory.

Volume (Year): 32 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (December)
Pages: 17-31

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:32:y:2003:i:1:p:17-31
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  1. Jonathan Levin & Susan Athey, 2001. "The Value of Information in Monotone Decision Problems," Working Papers 01003, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
  2. Grant, S. & Polak, B. & Kajii, A., 1996. "Preference for Information," Papers 298, Australian National University - Department of Economics.
  3. Aumann, Robert J. & Sorin, Sylvain, 1989. "Cooperation and bounded recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 5-39, March.
  4. Schlee, Edward, 1990. " The Value of Information in Anticipated Utility Theory," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 83-92, March.
  5. Sulganik, Eyal & Zilcha, Itzhak, 1997. "The value of information: The case of signal-dependent opportunity sets," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 21(10), pages 1615-1625, August.
  6. Nicola Persico, 1997. "Information Acquisition in Auctions," UCLA Economics Working Papers 762, UCLA Department of Economics.
  7. Neyman, Abraham, 1991. "The positive value of information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 350-355, August.
  8. Gossner, Olivier, 2000. "Comparison of Information Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 44-63, January.
  9. Grant, S & Kajii, A & Polak, B, 1997. "Intrinsic Preference for Information," Papers 323, Australian National University - Department of Economics.
  10. David M Kreps & Evan L Porteus, 1978. "Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Dynamic Choice Theory," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000009, David K. Levine.
  11. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1971. "The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 561-74, September.
  12. Kamien, Morton I. & Tauman, Yair & Zamir, Shmuel, 1990. "On the value of information in a strategic conflict," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 129-153, June.
  13. Mertens, J.-F., 1986. "Repeated games," CORE Discussion Papers 1986024, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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