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Information Design: A Unified Perspective

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Abstract

Fixing a game with uncertain payoffs, information design identifies the information structure and equilibrium that maximizes the payoff of an information designer. We show how this perspective unifies existing work, including that on communication in games (Myerson (1991)), Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)) and some of our own recent work. Information design has a literal interpretation, under which there is a real information designer who can commit to the choice of the best information structure (from her perspective) for a set of participants in a game. We emphasize a metaphorical interpretation, under which the information design problem is used by the analyst to characterize play in the game under many different information structures.

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  • Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2075R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Mar 2017.
  • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2075r
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    Cited by:

    1. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2017. "Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 744-759.
    2. Bizzotto, Jacopo & Perez-Richet, Eduardo & Vigier, Adrien, 2019. "Information Design with Agency," CEPR Discussion Papers 13868, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Aleksei Smirnov & Egor Starkov, 2019. "Timing of predictions in dynamic cheap talk: experts vs. quacks," ECON - Working Papers 334, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    4. Armstrong, Mark & Zhou, Jidong, 2019. "Consumer information and the limits to competition," MPRA Paper 97123, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Vladimir Asriyan & William Fuchs & Brett Green, 2017. "Aggregation and Design of Information in Asset Markets with Adverse Selection," Working Papers 979, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    6. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019. "Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1121, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    7. Leitner, Yaron & Yilmaz, Bilge, 2019. "Regulating a model," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(2), pages 251-268.
    8. Cong, Lin William & Grenadier, Steven R. & Hu, Yunzhi, 2020. "Dynamic interventions and informational linkages," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 1-15.
    9. Christoph Schottmüller, 2019. "Welfare optimal information structures in bilateral trade," Working Paper Series in Economics 98, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
    10. Burkovskaya, Anastasia & Li, Jian, 2020. "Comparative Profitability of Product Disclosure Statements," Working Papers 2020-01, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
    11. Carroni, Elias & Ferrari, Luca & Righi, Simone, 2019. "The price of discovering your needs online," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 317-330.
    12. Tong Zhang & Yixue Huo & Xin Zhang & Jie Shuai, 2019. "Endogenous third-degree price discrimination in Hotelling model with elastic demand," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 127(2), pages 125-145, July.
    13. Goldstein, Itay & Leitner, Yaron, 2018. "Stress tests and information disclosure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 34-69.
    14. Leal Vizcaíno René & Mekonnen Teddy, 2019. "Bayesian Comparative Statics," Working Papers 2019-03, Banco de México.
    15. Shuran Zheng & Yiling Chen, 2020. "Optimal Advertising for Information Products," Papers 2002.10045, arXiv.org.
    16. Carvajal, Andrés & Rostek, Marzena & Sublet, Guillaume, 2018. "Information design and capital formation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 255-292.
    17. Isaiah Andrews & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2020. "A Model of Scientific Communication," NBER Working Papers 26824, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Liang Lu & Thomas Reardon, 2018. "An Economic Model of the Evolution of Food Retail and Supply Chains from Traditional Shops to Supermarkets to E-Commerce," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 100(5), pages 1320-1335.
    19. Liu, Yixuan & Whinston, Andrew B., 2019. "Efficient real-time routing for autonomous vehicles through Bayes correlated equilibrium: An information design framework," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 14-26.
    20. Terstiege, Stefan, 2018. "On the signal realization set in contracting with information disclosure," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 83-86.
    21. Chan, Jimmy & Gupta, Seher & Li, Fei & Wang, Yun, 2019. "Pivotal persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 178-202.
      • Jimmy Chan & Seher Gupta & Fei Li & Yun Wang, 2018. "Pivotal Persuasion," Working Papers 2018-11-03, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University.
    22. Le Treust, Maël & Tomala, Tristan, 2019. "Persuasion with limited communication capacity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    23. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 2020. "Notes on “refinements and higher order beliefs”," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 71(1), pages 35-41, January.
    24. Pram, Kym, 2019. "On the equivalence of robustness to canonical and general elaborations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 1-10.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Information design; Bayesian persuasion; correlated equilibrium; incomplete information; robust predictions; information structure;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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