The Limits of Price Discrimination
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- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2015. "The Limits of Price Discrimination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(3), pages 921-957, March.
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2013. "The Limits of Price Discrimination," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1896, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2013. "The Limits of Price Discrimination," Working Papers 1464, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2013. "The Limits of Price Discrimination," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1896R3, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Sep 2014.
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2013. "The Limits of Price Discrimination," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1896R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jul 2013.
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2013. "The Limits of Price Discrimination," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1896R2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Apr 2014.
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"The Limits of Price Discrimination,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(3), pages 921-957, March.
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- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2013. "The Limits of Price Discrimination," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1896R3, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Sep 2014.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2013-09-26 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2013-09-26 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2013-09-26 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-MKT-2013-09-26 (Marketing)
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