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Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games

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Abstract

The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may have access to additional signals beyond the given information structure is equivalent to the set of a version of incomplete information correlated equilibrium which we dub Bayes correlated equilibrium. A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game, given by actions sets and payoff functions, and an information structure. We identify a partial order on many player information structures (individual sufficiency) under which more information shrinks the set of Bayes correlated equilibria.

Suggested Citation

  • Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1909RR, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Oct 2014.
  • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1909rr
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Vladimir Asriyan & William Fuchs & Brett Green, 2017. "Information Aggregation in Dynamic Markets with Adverse Selection," Working Papers 979, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    2. repec:kap:compec:v:52:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s10614-017-9646-z is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Vasilis Syrgkanis & Elie Tamer & Juba Ziani, 2017. "Inference on Auctions with Weak Assumptions on Information," Papers 1710.03830, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2018.
    4. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2016. "Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(5), pages 586-591, May.
    5. Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2015. "Information and Market Power," Levine's Bibliography 786969000000001101, UCLA Department of Economics.
    6. Kloosterman, Andrew, 2015. "Public information in Markov games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 28-48.
    7. Fabrizio Germano & Peio Zuazo-Garin, 2017. "Bounded rationality and correlated equilibria," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(3), pages 595-629, August.
    8. Elias Tsakas & Nikolas Tsakas, 2018. "Noisy Persuasion," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 11-2018, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
    9. Daniel Kraehmer, 2018. "Full surplus extraction in mechanism design with information disclosure," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_011_2018, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    10. repec:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:744-759 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2017. "Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 744-759.
    12. E. Carroni & L. Ferrari & S. Righi, 2018. "The Price of Discovering Your Needs Online," Working Papers wp1116, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    13. Tang, Qianfeng, 2015. "Hierarchies of beliefs and the belief-invariant Bayesian solution," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 111-116.
    14. repec:eee:jetheo:v:174:y:2018:i:c:p:103-123 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Tang, Qianfeng, 2015. "Interim partially correlated rationalizability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 36-44.
    16. Ryan Chahrour & Robert Ulbricht, 2017. "Information-driven Business Cycles: A Primal Approach," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 925, Boston College Department of Economics.
    17. Carroll, Gabriel, 2016. "Informationally robust trade and limits to contagion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 334-361.
    18. Pavan, Alessandro & Vives, Xavier, 2015. "Information, Coordination, and Market Frictions: An Introduction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 407-426.
    19. Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2018. "On the value of persuasion by experts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 103-123.
    20. repec:eee:gamebe:v:109:y:2018:i:c:p:126-131 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Correlated equilibrium; Incomplete information; Robust predictions; Information structure; Sufficiency; Blackwell ordering;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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