Comparison of information structures
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Gossner, Olivier, 2000. "Comparison of Information Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 44-63, January.
- GOSSNER, Olivier, 1997. "Comparison of information structures," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1997091, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
References listed on IDEAS
- repec:dau:papers:123456789/6244 is not listed on IDEAS
- Aumann, Robert J, 1987.
"Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 1-18, January.
- Robert J. Aumann, 2010. "Correlated Equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian Rationality," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000377, David K. Levine.
- R. Aumann, 2010. "Correlated Equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian Rationality," Levine's Bibliography 513, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Aumann, Robert J., 1974.
"Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
- AUMANN, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," LIDAM Reprints CORE 167, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- R. Aumann, 2010. "Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies," Levine's Working Paper Archive 389, David K. Levine.
- Hirshleifer, Jack, 1971. "The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 561-574, September.
- Gossner, Olivier, 1998.
"Secure Protocols or How Communication Generates Correlation,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 69-89, November.
- GOSSNER, Olivier, 1997. "Secure protocols or how communication generates correlation," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1997092, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- GOSSNER, Olivier, 1998. "Secure protocols or how communication generates correlation," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1361, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Mertens, J.-F., 1994. "Correlated- and communication equilibria," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1103, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Neyman, Abraham, 1991. "The positive value of information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 350-355, August.
- Dov Monderer & Dov Samet, 1996. "Proximity of Information in Games with Incomplete Information," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 21(3), pages 707-725, August.
- George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2019.
"Information Design: A Unified Perspective,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(1), pages 44-95, March.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Working Papers 089_2017, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2075R2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Nov 2017.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2075R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Mar 2017.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2075, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2075R3, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Mar 2018.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 11867, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013.
"The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1909R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised May 2014.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000730, David K. Levine.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1909, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Lehrer, Ehud & Rosenberg, Dinah & Shmaya, Eran, 2010.
"Signaling and mediation in games with common interests,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 670-682, March.
- Dinah Rosenberg & Ehud Lehrer & Eran Shmaya, 2010. "Signaling and mediation in games with common interest," Post-Print hal-00528396, HAL.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013.
"Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
786969000000000725, David K. Levine.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1822R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Lehrer, Ehud & Rosenberg, Dinah, 2006.
"What restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information?,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 343-357, June.
- Ehud Lehrer & Dinah Rosenberg, 2003. "What restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information?," Game Theory and Information 0312005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Kar, Anirban & Ray, Indrajit & Serrano, Roberto, 2005.
"Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions,"
UC3M Working papers. Economics
we057238, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- Anirban Kar & Indrajit Ray & Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Multiple Equilibria as a Difficulty in Understanding Correlated Distributions," Working Papers 2005-10, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Anirban Kar & Indrajit Ray & Robedrto Serrano, 2005. "Multiple Equilibria as a Difficulty in Understanding Correlated Distributions," Discussion Papers 05-18, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- Anirban Kar & Indrajit Ray & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions," Working Papers 2007-03, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
- repec:dau:papers:123456789/171 is not listed on IDEAS
- John Duffy & Ernest K. Lai & Wooyoung Lim, 2017. "Coordination via correlation: an experimental study," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(2), pages 265-304, August.
- Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2002.
"Correlated Equilibrium in Stochastic Games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 362-399, February.
- Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 1998. "Correlated Equilibrium in Stochastic Games," Discussion Papers 1226, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2002. "Correlated Equilibrium in Stochastic Games," Post-Print hal-00465020, HAL.
- Heller, Yuval, 2010.
"Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 394-400, July.
- Heller, Yuval, 2005. "A minority-proof cheap-talk protocol," MPRA Paper 7716, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Feb 2008.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2016.
"Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(2), May.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games," Working Papers 054-2013, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1909RR, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Oct 2014.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2015. "Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games," Levine's Bibliography 786969000000001085, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1909R3, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Apr 2015.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2017.
"Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 744-759.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2016. "Belief-Free Rationalizability and Informational Robustness," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2066, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2016. "Belief-Free Rationalizability and Informational Robustness," Working Papers 086_2016, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2017. "Belief-Free Rationalizability and Informational Robustness," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2088, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Ayala Mashiah-Yaakovi, 2015. "Correlated Equilibria in Stochastic Games with Borel Measurable Payoffs," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 120-135, March.
- Angeletos, G.-M. & Lian, C., 2016. "Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1065-1240, Elsevier.
- Lehrer, Ehud & Rosenberg, Dinah & Shmaya, Eran, 2013.
"Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 179-191.
- Ehud Lehrer & Dinah Rosenberg & Eran Shmaya, 2013. "Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence," Post-Print hal-01069192, HAL.
- Ray, Indrajit, 1996.
"Efficiency in correlated equilibrium,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 157-178, December.
- RAY , Indrajit, 1995. "Efficiency in Correlated Equilibrium," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1995018, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Ray, I., 1996. "Efficiency in correlated equilibrium," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1243, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Yuval Heller & Eyal Winter, 2016.
"Rule Rationality,"
International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57(3), pages 997-1026, August.
- Heller, Yuval & Winter, Eyal, 2013. "Rule Rationality," MPRA Paper 48746, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Kalai, Adam Tauman & Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud & Samet, Dov, 2010. "A commitment folk theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 127-137, May.
- Cédric Wanko, 2018. "A Unique and Stable $$\hbox {Se}{\mathcal {C}}\hbox {ure}$$ Se C ure Reversion Protocol Improving Efficiency: A Computational Bayesian Approach for Empirical Analysis," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 52(1), pages 1-23, June.
- Indrajit Ray, 2002. "Multiple Equilibrium Problem and Non-Canonical Correlation Devices," Working Papers 2002-24, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Olivier Gossner, 1997. "Protocoles de communication robustes," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 48(3), pages 685-695.
More about this item
Keywords
Game--theory; information; correlation;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:169. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.econ.upf.edu/ .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.