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What restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information?

Author

Listed:
  • Ehud Lehrer

    (Tel Aviv U.)

  • Dinah Rosenberg

    (U. Paris Nord)

Abstract

In a Bayesian game players play an unknown game. Before the game starts some players may receive a signal regarding the specific game actually played. Typically, information structures that determine different signals, induce different equilibrium payoffs.In zero-sum games the equilibrium payoff measures the value of the particular information structure which induces it. We pose a question as to what restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information. We provide answers in two kinds of information structures: symmetric, where both players are equally informed, and one-sided where only one player is informed.

Suggested Citation

  • Ehud Lehrer & Dinah Rosenberg, 2003. "What restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information?," Game Theory and Information 0312005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0312005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Gossner, Olivier, 2010. "Ability and knowledge," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 95-106, May.
    2. Mark Whitmeyer, 2020. "In Simple Communication Games, When Does Ex Ante Fact-Finding Benefit the Receiver?," Papers 2001.09387, arXiv.org.
    3. Bernard de Meyer & Ehud Lehrer & Dinah Rosenberg, 2009. "Evaluating information in zero-sum games with incomplete information on both sides," Post-Print halshs-00390625, HAL.
    4. Tanja Hörtnagl & Rudolf Kerschbamer, 2014. "How the Value of Information Shapes the Value of Commitment Or: Why the Value of Commitment Does Not Vanish," Working Papers 2014-03, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    5. Rébillé, Yann, 2011. "A Radon-Nikodym approach to measure information," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 170-177, May.
    6. Federico Echenique, 2008. "What Matchings Can Be Stable? The Testable Implications of Matching Theory," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 33(3), pages 757-768, August.
    7. Florian Gauer & Christoph Kuzmics, 2020. "Cognitive Empathy In Conflict Situations," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 61(4), pages 1659-1678, November.
    8. Kloosterman, Andrew, 2015. "Public information in Markov games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 28-48.
    9. Yanling Chang & Alan Erera & Chelsea White, 2015. "Value of information for a leader–follower partially observed Markov game," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 235(1), pages 129-153, December.
    10. Hörtnagl, Tanja & Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Stracke, Rudi, 2019. "Competing for market shares: Does the order of moves matter even when it shouldn’t?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 346-365.
    11. Manxi Wu & Saurabh Amin & Asuman E. Ozdaglar, 2021. "Value of Information in Bayesian Routing Games," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 69(1), pages 148-163, January.
    12. Cabrales, Antonio & Gossner, Olivier & Serrano, Roberto, 2017. "A normalized value for information purchases," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 266-288.
    13. Ezra Einy & Ori Haimanko & Biligbaatar Tumendemberel, 2012. "Continuity of the value and optimal strategies when common priors change," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(4), pages 829-849, November.
    14. Bernard De Meyer & Ehud Lehrer & Dinah Rosenberg, 2010. "Evaluating Information in Zero-Sum Games with Incomplete Information on Both Sides," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 35(4), pages 851-863, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    value of information; zero-sum; information structure; partition; Beyesian game;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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