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What restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information?

  • Ehud Lehrer

    (Tel Aviv U.)

  • Dinah Rosenberg

    (U. Paris Nord)

In a Bayesian game players play an unknown game. Before the game starts some players may receive a signal regarding the specific game actually played. Typically, information structures that determine different signals, induce different equilibrium payoffs.In zero-sum games the equilibrium payoff measures the value of the particular information structure which induces it. We pose a question as to what restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information. We provide answers in two kinds of information structures: symmetric, where both players are equally informed, and one-sided where only one player is informed.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0312005.

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Date of creation: 11 Dec 2003
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0312005
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Contact details of provider: Web page: http://128.118.178.162

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  1. Schlee, Edward, 1990. " The Value of Information in Anticipated Utility Theory," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 83-92, March.
  2. Itzhak Gilboa & Ehud Lehrer, 1989. "The Value of Information -- An Axiomatic Approach," Discussion Papers 835, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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  11. Nicola Persico, 2000. "Information Acquisition in Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(1), pages 135-148, January.
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  13. Robert J Aumann, 1999. "Agreeing to Disagree," Levine's Working Paper Archive 512, David K. Levine.
  14. Debreu, Gerard, 1974. "Excess demand functions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 15-21, March.
  15. Neyman, Abraham, 1991. "The positive value of information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 350-355, August.
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  19. Gossner, Olivier, 2010. "Ability and knowledge," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 95-106, May.
  20. Ehud Lehrer & Dinah Rosenberg, 2003. "Information and Its Value in Zero-Sum Repeated Games," Game Theory and Information 0312003, EconWPA.
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