Information and Its Value in Zero-Sum Repeated Games
Two players play an unknown zero-sum repeated game. Before the game starts one player may receive signals, whose nature is specified by an information structure, regarding the game actually played. We characterize when one information structure is better for the maximizer than another. We also characterize those functions defined on partitions that determine the equilibrium payoff when one player is informed about the cell of the partition that contains the realized state.
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