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Stochastic Games : recent results

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  • Nicolas Vieille

    (CECO - Laboratoire d'économétrie de l'École polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This is a survey of recent results on stochastic games, prepared for the le Handbook of Game Theory, vol 3., eds. R.J. Aumann et S. Hart

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Vieille, 2002. "Stochastic Games : recent results," Working Papers hal-00242996, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00242996
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00242996
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), 2002. "Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 3, number 3.
    2. Frank Thuijsman & Thirukkannamangai E. S. Raghavan, 1997. "Perfect Information Stochastic Games and Related Classes," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 26(3), pages 403-408.
    3. Sorin, Sylvain, 1992. "Repeated games with complete information," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 4, pages 71-107, Elsevier.
    4. Aumann, Robert J. & Heifetz, Aviad, 2002. "Incomplete information," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 43, pages 1665-1686, Elsevier.
    5. Mertens, Jean-Francois, 2002. "Stochastic games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 47, pages 1809-1832, Elsevier.
    6. Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 1998. "Quitting Games," Discussion Papers 1227, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    7. SORIN, Sylvain, 1984. "'Big match' with lack of information on one side (part 1)," LIDAM Reprints CORE 601, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    8. Mertens,Jean-François & Sorin,Sylvain & Zamir,Shmuel, 2015. "Repeated Games," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107030206, October.
      • Mertens,Jean-François & Sorin,Sylvain & Zamir,Shmuel, 2015. "Repeated Games," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107662636, October.
    9. Eilon Solan, 1999. "Three-Player Absorbing Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 24(3), pages 669-698, August.
    10. Dinah Rosenberg & Nicolas Vieille, 2000. "The Maxmin of Recursive Games with Incomplete Information on one Side," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 25(1), pages 23-35, February.
    11. Donald A. Walker (ed.), 2000. "Equilibrium," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, volume 0, number 1585.
    12. Robert J. Aumann, 1995. "Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262011476, April.
    13. Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2002. "Correlated Equilibrium in Stochastic Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 362-399, February.
    14. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6231 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Nicolas Vieille & Dinah Rosenberg, 2000. "The Maxmin of Recursive Games with Incomplete Information on one Side," Post-Print hal-00481429, HAL.
    16. Sergiu Hart, 1985. "Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 10(1), pages 117-153, February.
    17. Zamir, Shmuel, 1992. "Repeated games of incomplete information: Zero-sum," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 109-154, Elsevier.
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    Cited by:

    1. Laraki, Rida & Sorin, Sylvain, 2015. "Advances in Zero-Sum Dynamic Games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    2. Burhaneddin Sandıkçı & Lisa M. Maillart & Andrew J. Schaefer & Oguzhan Alagoz & Mark S. Roberts, 2008. "Estimating the Patient's Price of Privacy in Liver Transplantation," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 56(6), pages 1393-1410, December.
    3. Boyarchenko, Svetlana & Levendorskiĭ, Sergei, 2014. "Preemption games under Lévy uncertainty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 354-380.
    4. Walker, Mark & Wooders, John & Amir, Rabah, 2011. "Equilibrium play in matches: Binary Markov games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 487-502, March.
    5. Andrzej Nowak & Eilon Solan & Sylvain Sorin, 2013. "Preface: Special Issue on Stochastic Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 125-127, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Stochastic games; Jeux stochastiques;

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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