The value of two-person zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information and uncertain duration
It is known that the value of a zero-sum infinitely repeated game with incomplete information on both sides need not exist [Aumann Maschler 95]. It is proved that any number between the minmax and the maxmin of the zero-sum infinitely repeated game with incomplete information on both sides is the value of the long finitely repeated game where players' information about the uncertain number of repetitions is asymmetric.
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Volume (Year): 41 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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- Mertens,Jean-François & Sorin,Sylvain & Zamir,Shmuel, 2015.
Cambridge University Press, number 9781107030206, December.
- MERTENS, Jean-François, .
CORE Discussion Papers RP
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- Abraham Neyman, 2009. "The Maximal Variation of Martingales of Probabilities and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Discussion Paper Series dp510, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
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