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On the maxmin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring

  • Dinah Rosenberg

    (LAGA - Laboratoire d'Analyse, Géométrie et Applications - CNRS : UMR7539 - Université Paris-Nord - Paris XIII)

  • Eilon Solan

    (Northwestern University)

  • Nicolas Vieille

    (CECO - Laboratoire d'econometrie de l'école polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7657 - Polytechnique - X)

Nous étudions les jeux stochastiques à somme nulle où les joueurs n'observent pas nécessairement les actions choisies par leur adversaire. Nous supposons seulement que chacun des joueurs observe au moins l'état courant du jeu, ainsi que sa propre action. L'article propose un traitement unifié de plusieurs résultats dus à Coulomb.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00242999.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00242999
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00242999/en/
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  1. Rubinstein, Ariel & Yaari, Menahem E., 1983. "Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 74-97, June.
  2. Aumann, Robert J. & Heifetz, Aviad, 2001. "Incomplete Information," Working Papers 1124, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  3. Mertens, Jean-Francois, 2002. "Stochastic games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 47, pages 1809-1832 Elsevier.
  4. Lehrer, Ehud, 1992. "On the Equilibrium Payoffs Set of Two Player Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 211-26.
  5. Robert J. Aumann, 1995. "Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262011476, June.
  6. Radner, Roy, 1981. "Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(5), pages 1127-48, September.
  7. Lehrer, E, 1990. "Nash Equilibria of n-Player Repeated Games with Semi-standard Information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 191-217.
  8. Vrieze, O J & Thuijsman, F, 1989. "On Equilibria in Repeated Games with Absorbing States," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 293-310.
  9. Lehrer, E, 1989. "Lower Equilibrium Payoffs in Two-Player Repeated Games with Non-observable Actions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 57-89.
  10. Coulomb, Jean-Michel, 1992. "Repeated Games with Absorbing States and No Signals," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 161-74.
  11. Eilon Solan & Rakesh V. Vohra, 1999. "Correlated Equilibrium, Public Signaling and Absorbing Games," Discussion Papers 1272, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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