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Absorbing Games with Compact Action Spaces


  • Jean-François Mertens

    () (CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium)

  • Abraham Neyman

    () (Institute of Mathematics and Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Givat Ram, 91904 Jerusalem, Israel)

  • Dinah Rosenberg

    () (Université Paris 13, CNRS, F-93 430 Villetaneuse, France, and Laboratoire d'Econométrie de l'École Polytechnique, 75005 Paris, France)


We prove that games with absorbing states with compact action sets have a value.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-François Mertens & Abraham Neyman & Dinah Rosenberg, 2009. "Absorbing Games with Compact Action Spaces," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 34(2), pages 257-262, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:34:y:2009:i:2:p:257-262

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2003. "The MaxMin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(1), pages 133-150, December.
    2. Mertens, Jean-Francois, 2002. "Stochastic games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 47, pages 1809-1832 Elsevier.
    3. Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2002. "Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Discussion Papers 1341, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    4. Abraham Neyman, 2002. "Stochastic games: Existence of the MinMax," Discussion Paper Series dp295, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
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    Cited by:

    1. Laraki, Rida & Renault, Jérôme, 2017. "Acyclic Gambling Games," TSE Working Papers 17-768, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    2. Levy, Yehuda, 2012. "Stochastic games with information lag," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 243-256.
    3. Rida Laraki, 2010. "Explicit formulas for repeated games with absorbing states," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(1), pages 53-69, March.
    4. Abraham Neyman & Sylvain Sorin, 2010. "Repeated games with public uncertain duration process," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(1), pages 29-52, March.
    5. repec:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:92-130 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Neyman, Abraham, 2017. "Continuous-time stochastic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 92-130.
    7. Sylvain Sorin, 2011. "Zero-Sum Repeated Games: Recent Advances and New Links with Differential Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 172-207, March.

    More about this item


    games; stochastic games; zero-sum; minimax; absorbing states; value;

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games


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