The MaxMin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring
We study finite zero-sum stochastic games in which players do not observe the actions of their opponent. Rather, at each stage, each player observes a stochastic signal that may depend on the current state and on the pair of actions chosen by the players. We assume that each player observes the state and his/her own action. We prove that the uniform max-min value always exists. Moreover, the uniform max-min value is independent of the information structure of player 2. Symmetric results hold for the uniform min-max value. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2003
Volume (Year): 32 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (December)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm|
|Order Information:||Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:32:y:2003:i:1:p:133-150. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.