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Deterministic Multi-Player Dynkin Games

  • Nicolas, VIEILLE

    ()

  • Eilon, SOLAN

    ()

    (Kellogg School of Management)

A multi-player Dynkin game is a sequential game in which at every stage one of the players is chosen, and that player can decide whether to continue the game or to stop it, in which case all players receive some terminal payoff. We study a variant of this model, where the order by which players are chosen is deterministic, and the probability that the game terminates once the chosen player decides to stop may be strictly less than one. We prove that a subgame-perfect e-equilibrium in Markovian strategies exists. If the game is not degenerate this e-equilibrium is actually in pure strategies.

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Paper provided by HEC Paris in its series Les Cahiers de Recherche with number 772.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 20 Jan 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ebg:heccah:0772
Contact details of provider: Postal: HEC Paris, 78351 Jouy-en-Josas cedex, France
Web page: http://www.hec.fr/
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  1. VIEILLE, Nicolas & SOLAN, Eilon, 2001. "Quitting games - an example," Les Cahiers de Recherche 747, HEC Paris.
  2. Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2003. "Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Discussion Papers 1376, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. Mertens, J.-F., 1986. "Repeated games," CORE Discussion Papers 1986024, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2001. "On the MaxMin Value of Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Discussion Papers 1344, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2001. "Quitting Games," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/6017, Paris Dauphine University.
  6. Eilon Solan, 2002. "Subgame-Perfection in Quitting Games with Perfect Information and Differential Equations," Discussion Papers 1356, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  7. Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 1998. "Quitting Games," Discussion Papers 1227, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  8. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Mark, 1997. "The Truel," Working Papers 97-05, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  9. Janos Flesch & Frank Thuijsman & Koos Vrieze, 1997. "Cyclic Markov Equilibria in Stochastic Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 303-314.
  10. Eran Shmaya & Eilon Solan, 2002. "Two Player Non Zero-Sum Stopping Games in Discrete Time," Discussion Papers 1347, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  11. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, June.
  12. Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 1999. "Stopping Games with Randomized Strategies," Discussion Papers 1258, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  13. Fine, Charles H. & Li, Lode, 1989. "Equilibrium exit in stochastically declining industries," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 40-59, March.
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