An Application of Ramsey Theorem to stopping Games
We prove that every two-player non zero-sum deterministic stopping game with uniformly bounded payoffs admits an e-equilibrium, for every e>0. The proof uses Ramsey Theorem that states that for every coloring of a complete infinite graph by finitely many colors there is a complete infinite subgraph which is monochromatic.
|Date of creation:||24 Jul 2001|
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- Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 1999.
"Stopping Games with Randomized Strategies,"
1258, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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Les Cahiers de Recherche
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- Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2003. "Quitting games – An example," Post-Print hal-00464962, HAL.
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