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Dynamics in Art of War

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  • Sandroni, Alvaro
  • Urgun, Can

Abstract

This paper examines basic principles in Sun Tzu’s classic treatise Art of War. In a dynamic decision-theoretic model, there is a potential conflict between two sides. The comparative statics results show precise conditions under which the principles of strategic fighting in Art of War hold.

Suggested Citation

  • Sandroni, Alvaro & Urgun, Can, 2017. "Dynamics in Art of War," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 51-58.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:86:y:2017:i:c:p:51-58
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.12.006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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