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Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

  • Abreu, Dilip
  • Pearce, David
  • Stacchetti, Ennio
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    This paper investigates pure strategy sequential equilibria of repeated games with imperfect monitoring. The approach emphasizes the equilibrium value set and the static optimization problems embedded in extremal equilibria. A succession of propositions, central among which is "self-generation," allow properties of constrained efficient supergame equilibria to be deduced from the solutions of the static problems. The authors show that the latter include solutions having a "bang-bang" property; this affords a significant simplification of the equilibria that need be considered. These results apply to a broad class of asymmetric games, thereby generalizing their earlier work on optimal cartel equilibria. Copyright 1990 by The Econometric Society.

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    Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

    Volume (Year): 58 (1990)
    Issue (Month): 5 (September)
    Pages: 1041-63

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    Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:58:y:1990:i:5:p:1041-63
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    1. Recursive Macroeconomic Theory

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