IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ris/drxlwp/2018_008.html

Problems of Commitment in Arming and War: How Insecurity and Destruction Matter

Author

Listed:
  • Michelle Garfinkel

    (University of California-Irvine)

  • Constantinos Syropoulos

    (Drexel University)

Abstract

This paper analyzes a guns-versus-butter model in which two agents compete for control over an insecure portion of their combined output. They can resolve this dispute either peacefully through settlement or by military force through open conflict (war). Both types of conflict resolution depend on the agents' arming choices, but only war is destructive. We find that, insofar as entering into binding contracts on arms is not possible and agents must arm even under settlement to secure a bigger share of the contested output, the absence of long-term commitments need not be essential in understanding the outbreak of destructive war. Instead, the ability to make short-term commitments could induce war. More generally, our analysis highlights how the pattern of war's destructive effects, the degree of output insecurity and the initial distribution of resources matter for arming decisions and the choice between peace and war. We also explore the implications of transfers for peace.

Suggested Citation

  • Michelle Garfinkel & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2018. "Problems of Commitment in Arming and War: How Insecurity and Destruction Matter," School of Economics Working Paper Series 2018-8, LeBow College of Business, Drexel University.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:drxlwp:2018_008
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1yciSW2yfznyCR01GzzbSrjiWepNSrjKQ/view?usp=drive_open
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 2021. "Self-enforcing peace agreements that preserve the status quo," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 148-178.
    2. Schaller, Zachary & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2020. "Bargaining and conflict with up-front investments: How power asymmetries matter," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 212-225.
    3. Todd Sandler, 2019. "Affinity, arming, consequences, and perceptions: an introduction," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(3), pages 319-327, March.
    4. Kyung nok Chun & Zachary Schaller & Stergios Skaperdas, 2020. "Why Are There Strikes?," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(6), pages 929-956.
    5. Michelle Garfinkel & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2022. "International Trade and Stable Resolutions of Resource Disputes," School of Economics Working Paper Series 2022-9, LeBow College of Business, Drexel University.
    6. Parashari, Gopal Sharan & Kumar, Vimal, 2020. "Destruction and settlement norms as determinants of conflict: An evolutionary perspective," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    7. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2019. "On Trade and the Stability of (Armed) Peace," Working Papers 181910, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ris:drxlwp:2018_008. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Richard C. Barnett (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dedreus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.