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Dispute Resolution Institutions and Strategic Militarization

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  • Adam Meirowitz
  • Massimo Morelli
  • Kristopher W. Ramsay
  • Francesco Squintani

Abstract

Existant studies of confl ict, negotiation and international relations do not take into account that the institutions used to resolve disputes shape the incentives for entering disputes in the first place. Because engagement in a costly and destructive war is the `punishment' for entering a dispute, institutions that reduce the chances that a dispute lead to open con flict may make more disputes emerge and incentivize militarization. We provide a simple model in which the support for unmediated peace talks, while effective in improving the chance of peace for a given distribution of military strength, ultimately leads to the emergence of more disputes and to higher con flict outbreak. Happily, we find that not all con flict resolution institutions suffer from these, apparently paradoxical, but actually quite intuitive drawbacks. We identify a form of third-party intervention inspired by the celebrated work by Myerson, and show that it can broker peace in emerged disputes effectively and also avoid perverse militarization incentives.

Suggested Citation

  • Adam Meirowitz & Massimo Morelli & Kristopher W. Ramsay & Francesco Squintani, 2015. "Dispute Resolution Institutions and Strategic Militarization," Working Papers 540, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    • Handle: RePEc:igi:igierp:540
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    Cited by:

    1. Gautam Bose, 2023. "Contributing to Peace," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 67(10), pages 1993-2027, November.
    2. Mueller, H. & Rauh, C., 2022. "Building Bridges to Peace: A Quantitative Evaluation of Power-Sharing Agreements," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2261, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    3. Hannes Mueller & Christopher Rauh, 2022. "The Hard Problem of Prediction for Conflict Prevention," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 20(6), pages 2440-2467.
    4. Stephane Wolton, 2024. "Decentralised information transmission in the shadow of conflict," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 36(1), pages 64-82, January.
    5. Morelli, Massimo & Meirowitz, Adam & Ramsay, Kristopher & Squintani, Francesco, 2019. "Third Party Intervention and Strategic Militarization," CEPR Discussion Papers 13879, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Hannes Mueller & Christopher Rauh, 2024. "Building bridges to peace: a quantitative evaluation of power-sharing agreements," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 39(118), pages 411-467.
    7. Björn Gehrmann, 2019. "Third-party diplomacy," HiCN Working Papers 312, Households in Conflict Network.
    8. Bonev, Petyo & Matsumoto, Shigeru, 2022. "An empirical evaluation of environmental Alternative Dispute Resolution methods," Economics Working Paper Series 2208, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
    9. Toke S. Aidt & Facundo Albornoz & Esther Hauk, 2021. "Foreign Influence and Domestic Policy," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 426-487, June.
    10. Edoardo Grillo & Antonio Nicolò, 2022. "Learning it the hard way: Conflicts, economic sanctions and military aids," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0284, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    11. Benjamin Balzer & Johannes Schneider, 2021. "Managing a conflict: optimal alternative dispute resolution," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(2), pages 415-445, June.
    12. Jin Yeub Kim, 2022. "Neutral public good mechanisms," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 17(4), pages 1-16, April.
    13. Muhammet A. Bas & Aseem Mahajan, 2020. "Contesting the climate," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 162(4), pages 1985-2002, October.
    14. Andrea Canidio & Joan-Maria Esteban, 2018. "Benevolent Mediation in the Shadow of Conflict," Working Papers 1027, Barcelona School of Economics.

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