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Conflict, Settlement, and the Shadow of the Future

  • Michael McBride


    (Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine)

  • Stergios Skaperdas


    (Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine)

In many instances of potential violent or non-violent conflict, the future strategic positions of adversaries are very different when there is open conflict than when there is settlement. Then, we show that as the future becomes more important, open conflict becomes more likely than settlement. We discuss the applicability of this finding in war, litigation, and other settings, and test it it in a laboratory experiment. We find that subjects are more likely to engage in risky conflict as the future becomes more important.

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Paper provided by University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 080922.

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Length: 45 pages
Date of creation: May 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:irv:wpaper:080922
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