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Bargaining Versus Fighting

  • Stergios Skaperdas

I examine the determinants of conflict and settlement by embedding probabilistic contests in a bargaining framework. Different costly enforcement efforts (e.g. arming, litigation expenditures) induce different disagreement points and Pareto frontiers. After examining the incentives for settlement, I demonstrate how different division rules and bargaining norms have real, economic effects. I then analyze some sources of conflict. I emphasize long-term, strategic considerations by examining an illustrative model and discussing particular historical examples.

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Article provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Defence and Peace Economics.

Volume (Year): 17 (2006)
Issue (Month): 6 ()
Pages: 657-676

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Handle: RePEc:taf:defpea:v:17:y:2006:i:6:p:657-676
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  1. Paul Collier & V. L. Elliott & Håvard Hegre & Anke Hoeffler & Marta Reynal-Querol & Nicholas Sambanis, 2003. "Breaking the Conflict Trap : Civil War and Development Policy," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 13938.
  2. Avner Greif, 1997. "Self-enforcing Political System and Economic Growth: Late Medieval Genoa," Working Papers 97037, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
  3. Garfinkel, Michelle R, 1994. "Domestic Politics and International Conflict," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(5), pages 1294-1309, December.
  4. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2007. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Handbook of Defense Economics, Elsevier.
  5. Jack Hirshleifer, 1989. "Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(2), pages 101-112, November.
  6. Bester, Helmut & Konrad, Kai A., 2003. "Delay in Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers 3784, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Bester, Helmut & Wärneryd, Karl, 2006. "Conflict and the Social Contract," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 94, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  8. Alex Robson & Stergios Skaperdas, 2005. "Costly Enforcement of Property Rights and the Coase Theorem," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2005-455, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
  9. Jack Hirshleifer, 1995. "Theorizing About Conflict," UCLA Economics Working Papers 727, UCLA Department of Economics.
  10. Michelle R Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2001. "Conflict Without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information: How the Future Matters," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000011, David K. Levine.
  11. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Theorizing about conflict," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 165-189 Elsevier.
  12. Anbarci, N. & Skaperdas, S. & Syropoulos, C., 2000. "Comparing Bargaining Solutions in the Shadow of Conflict: How Norms Against Threats Can Have Real Effects," Papers 00-01-19, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  13. Jack Hirshleifer & Michele Boldrin & David K Levine, 2009. "The Slippery Slope Of Concession," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 47(2), pages 197-205, 04.
  14. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
  15. Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2004. "The use of conflict as a bargaining tool against unsophisticated opponents," ESE Discussion Papers 99, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  16. Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(03), pages 379-414, June.
  17. Robert H. Bates & Avner Greif & Margaret Levi & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, 1998. "Analytic Narratives," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 6355, April.
  18. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
  19. Stergios Skaperdas & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2002. "Insecure Property and the Efficiency of Exchange," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(476), pages 133-146, January.
  20. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521576475 is not listed on IDEAS
  21. Skaperdas, Stergios & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 1996. "Can the shadow of the future harm cooperation?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 355-372, May.
  22. Michael McBride & Stergios Skaperdas, 2005. "Explaining Conflict in Low-Income Countries: Incomplete Contracting in the Shadow of the Future," CESifo Working Paper Series 1636, CESifo Group Munich.
  23. Hess, Gregory D & Orphanides, Athanasios, 1995. "War Politics: An Economic, Rational-Voter Framework," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 828-46, September.
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