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Negotiating Constitution for Political Unions

  • Vikas Kumar


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    This paper provides a cradle-to-grave model for political union between two unequally endowed states. The main contribution of this paper is to highlight the role of technology gap and unequal distribution of resources in all the above cases.

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    Paper provided by eSocialSciences in its series Working Papers with number id:1797.

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    Date of creation: Dec 2008
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:1797
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    1. Friedman, David, 1977. "A Theory of the Size and Shape of Nations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(1), pages 59-77, February.
    2. Putnam, Robert D., 1988. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(03), pages 427-460, June.
    3. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Wen, Quan, 1995. "Perfect Equilibria in Negotiation Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 545-65, May.
    4. Jeremy A.Rogoff Bulow & Kenneth, 1986. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 43, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
    5. Bordignon, Massimo & Brusco, Sandro, 2001. "Optimal secession rules," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(10), pages 1811-1834, December.
    6. Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 2008. "Federal Institutions and the Democratic Transition: Learning from South Africa," NBER Working Papers 13733, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Vikas Kumar, 2008. "Negotiating Constitution for Political Unions," Microeconomics Working Papers 22386, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
    8. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 252, David K. Levine.
    9. Herschel I. Grossman, 2002. "Constitution or Conflict?," NBER Working Papers 8733, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Ludwig van den Hauwe, 2005. "Constitutional economics," Public Economics 0508010, EconWPA, revised 19 Aug 2005.
    11. Acemoglu,Daron & Robinson,James A., 2006. "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521855266, October.
    12. Fershtman, Chaim, 1990. "The importance of the agenda in bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 224-238, September.
    13. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1985. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Working papers 367, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    14. Chang Roberto, 1995. "Bargaining a Monetary Union," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 89-112, June.
    15. Albert Breton, 1964. "The Economics of Nationalism," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 72, pages 376.
    16. Stergios Skaperdas, 2006. "Bargaining Versus Fighting," Working Papers 060705, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
    17. Anbarci, N. & Skaperdas, S. & Syropoulos, C., 2000. "Comparing Bargaining Solutions in the Shadow of Conflict: How Norms Against Threats Can Have Real Effects," Papers 00-01-19, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
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