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Modeling Knowledge in Economic Analysis

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  • Larry Samuelson

Abstract

This paper provides an introduction to how knowledge is modeled in economic contexts and the role played by the concepts of knowledge and common knowledge in economic analysis.

Suggested Citation

  • Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Modeling Knowledge in Economic Analysis," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(2), pages 367-403, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:42:y:2004:i:2:p:367-403
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/0022051041409057
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mailath, George J & Samuelson, Larry & Swinkels, Jeroen M, 1993. "Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(2), pages 273-302, March.
    2. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    3. Stalnaker, Robert, 1996. "Knowledge, Belief and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(02), pages 133-163, October.
    4. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, January.
    5. Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps & David K. Levine, 2008. "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 5, pages 67-93 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    6. George J. Mailath, 1998. "Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(3), pages 1347-1374, September.
    7. Samet, Dov, 1990. "Ignoring ignorance and agreeing to disagree," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 190-207, October.
    8. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
    9. Gilboa,Itzhak & Schmeidler,David, 2001. "A Theory of Case-Based Decisions," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521802345.
    10. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2002. "Strong Belief and Forward Induction Reasoning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 356-391, October.
    11. Crawford, Vincent P, 1985. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules: A Reformulation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 817-835, July.
    12. Adam Brandenburger, 1992. "Knowledge and Equilibrium in Games," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 83-101, Fall.
    13. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "The Theory of Learning in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061945, January.
    14. Geir B. Asheim, 2002. "Proper rationalizability in lexicographic beliefs," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 30(4), pages 453-478.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Pierre Garrouste, 2008. "The Austrian roots of the economics of institutions," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 21(4), pages 251-269, December.
    2. Chen, Yi-Chun & Long, Ngo Van & Luo, Xiao, 2007. "Iterated strict dominance in general games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 299-315, November.
    3. Robin P. Cubitt & Robert Sugden, 2008. "Common reasoning in games," Discussion Papers 2008-01, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    4. Chuma, Hiroyuki, 2006. "Increasing complexity and limits of organization in the microlithography industry: implications for science-based industries," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 394-411, April.
    5. Edward J. Malecki, 2010. "Everywhere? The Geography Of Knowledge," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(1), pages 493-513.
    6. Samuli Leppälä, 2015. "Economic Analysis Of Knowledge: The History Of Thought And The Central Themes," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 263-286, April.
    7. Antonelli, Cristiano, 2017. "From the Economics of Information to the Economics of Knowledge. Length: pages 39," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 201714, University of Turin.
    8. repec:eee:jeborg:v:137:y:2017:i:c:p:232-258 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Dominiak, Adam & Lefort, Jean-Philippe, 2015. "“Agreeing to disagree” type results under ambiguity," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 119-129.
    10. Amavilah, Voxi Heinrich, 2007. "The effects of technology-as-knowledge on the economic performance of developing countries: An econometric analysis using annual publications data for Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa, 1976-2004," MPRA Paper 3482, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Martin Hrubý & Petr Čambala & Jan Toufar, 2010. "Game-Theoretic Modeling of Electricity Markets in Central Europe," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 4(1), pages 032-061, March.
    12. Moscati Ivan, 2009. "Interactive and common knowledge in the state-space model," CESMEP Working Papers 200903, University of Turin.
    13. Rodrigues-Neto, José Alvaro, 2009. "From posteriors to priors via cycles," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 876-883, March.
    14. Robin Cubitt & Robert Sugden, 2005. "Common reasoning in games: a resolution of the paradoxes of ‘common knowledge of rationality’," Discussion Papers 2005-17, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    15. John R. Conlon, 2015. "Should Central Banks Burst Bubbles? Some Microeconomic Issues," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 125(582), pages 141-161, February.
    16. Ziv Hellman, 2013. "Almost common priors," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(2), pages 399-410, May.
    17. John Conlon, 2005. "Should Central Banks Burst Bubbles?," Game Theory and Information 0508007, EconWPA.
    18. Kai, Guo & Conlon, John R., 2007. "Why Bubble-Bursting Is Unpredictable: Welfare Effects Of Anti-Bubble Policy When Central Banks Make Mistakes," MPRA Paper 5927, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Antonelli, Cristiano, 2017. "From the Economics of Information to the Economics of Knowledge," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis LEI & BRICK - Laboratory of Economics of Innovation "Franco Momigliano", Bureau of Research in Innovation, Complexity and Knowledge, Collegio 201706, University of Turin.
    20. Geoffrey Brennan & Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt, 2004. "Approximate Truth in Economic Modelling," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2004-38, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
    21. Choo, Lawrence, 2016. "Market competition for decision rights: An experiment based on the “Hat Puzzle Problem”," MPRA Paper 73408, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    22. Amavilah, Voxi Heinrich, 2014. "Human Knowledge and a Commonsensical Measure of Human Capital: A Proposal," MPRA Paper 57670, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    23. Zambrano, Eduardo, 2008. "Epistemic conditions for rationalizability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 395-405, May.

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