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On some geometry and equivalence classes of normal form games

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Abstract

Equivalence classes of normal form games are defined using the geometry of correspondences of standard equilibiurm concepts like correlated, Nash, and robust equilibrium or risk dominance and rationalizability. Resulting equivalence classes are fully characterized and compared across different equilibrium concepts for 2 x 2 games. It is argued that the procedure can lead to broad and game-theoretically meaningful distinctions of games as well as to alternative ways of viewing and testing equilibrium concepts. Larger games are also briefly considered.

Suggested Citation

  • Fabrizio Germano, 2003. "On some geometry and equivalence classes of normal form games," Economics Working Papers 669, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  • Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:669
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    Cited by:

    1. Joseph Abdou & Nikolaos Pnevmatikos & Marco Scarsini, 2014. "Uniformity and games decomposition," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 14084, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    2. Inarra, E. & Larrea, C. & Saracho, A., 2014. "The von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets for the mixed extension of 2×2 games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(1), pages 70-73.
    3. Mengel, Friederike & Sciubba, Emanuela, 2014. "Extrapolation and structural similarity in games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(3), pages 381-385.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Non-cooperative games; classification and equivalence classes; experimental games; geometry of games;

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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