On Nash equivalence classes of generic normal form games
We introduce a procedure that uses basic topological characteristics of equilibrium correspondences of standard equilibrium concepts, to define broad equivalence classes of finite generic games in normal form. The proposed procedure is viewed as a potentially useful way of both organizing the underlying spaces of games as well as of comparing different equilibrium concepts with each other. The focus of the paper is mainly on equivalence classes induced by the Nash equilibrium concept. However, equivalence classes induced by the concepts of rationalizability, iterated dominance and correlated equilibrium are also considered.
|Date of creation:||01 May 1998|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)|
Fax: +32 10474304
Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/core
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jean-François Mertens, 2004.
"Ordinality in non cooperative games,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(3), pages 387-430, 06.
- Mertens, J.-F., 1987. "Ordinality in non cooperative games," CORE Discussion Papers 1987028, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- MERTENS, Jean-François, . "Ordinality in non cooperative games," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1738, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Barany, I & Lee, J & Shubik, M, 1992.
"Classification of Two-Person Ordinal Bimatrix Games,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 21(3), pages 267-90.
- Imre Barany & J. Lee & Martin Shubik, 1991. "Classification of Two-Person Ordinal Bimatrix Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 996, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Roth, Alvin E. & Erev, Ido, 1995. "Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 164-212.
- E. Kohlberg & J.-F. Mertens, 1998.
"On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
445, David K. Levine.
- Carlsson, H. & van Damme, E.E.C., 1993.
"Global games and equilibrium selection,"
Other publications TiSEM
49a54f00-dcec-4fc1-9488-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Carlsson, H. & Van Damme, E., 1990. "Global Games And Equilibrium Selection," Papers 9052, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Hans Carlsson & Eric van Damme, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001088, David K. Levine.
- Carlsson, H. & van Damme, E.E.C., 1990. "Global games and equilibrium selection," Discussion Paper 1990-52, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Blume, Lawrence E & Zame, William R, 1994.
"The Algebraic Geometry of Perfect and Sequential Equilibrium,"
Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 783-94, July.
- Lawrence E. Blume & William R. Zame, 1993. "The Algebraic Geometry of Perfect and Sequential Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9309001, EconWPA.
- Von Stengel, Bernhard, 2002. "Computing equilibria for two-person games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 45, pages 1723-1759 Elsevier.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1998033. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alain GILLIS)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.