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Common reasoning in games

Author

Listed:
  • Robin P. Cubitt

    (School of Economics, University of Nottingham)

  • Robert Sugden

    (School of Economics, University of East Anglia)

Abstract

This paper makes three related contributions to noncooperative game theory: (i) a solution concept (the “ICEU solution”), which is generated by an iterative procedure that constructs trinary partitions of strategy sets and deals with problems arising from weak dominance; (ii) a class of models of players’ reasoning, inspired by David Lewis’s work on common knowledge, which can together represent common knowledge of rationality for any consistent conception of individual practical rationality; and, using these ingredients, (iii) a diagnosis of paradoxes associated with the concept of common knowledge of rationality, as represented in Bayesian models of games.

Suggested Citation

  • Robin P. Cubitt & Robert Sugden, 2008. "Common reasoning in games," Discussion Papers 2008-01, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    • Handle: RePEc:not:notcdx:2008-01
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    File URL: https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/cedex/documents/papers/2008-01.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Cubitt, Robin P. & Sugden, Robert, 2011. "The reasoning-based expected utility procedure," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 328-338, March.
    2. Cubitt, Robin P. & Sugden, Robert, 2011. "The reasoning-based expected utility procedure," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 328-338, March.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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