The reasoning-based expected utility procedure
This paper presents a new iterative procedure for solving finite noncooperative games, the reasoning-based expected utility procedure (RBEU), and compares this with existing iterative procedures. RBEU deletes more strategies than iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies, while avoiding the conceptual problems associated with iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. It uses a sequence of “accumulation” and “deletion” operations to categorise strategies as permissible and impermissible; strategies may remain uncategorised when the procedure halts. RBEU and related “categorisation procedures” can be interpreted as tracking successive steps in players’ own reasoning.
|Date of creation:||Sep 2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: School of Economics University of Nottingham University Park Nottingham NG7 2RD|
Phone: (44) 0115 951 5620
Fax: (0115) 951 4159
Web page: http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/economics/cedex/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Quiggin, John, 1982. "A theory of anticipated utility," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 323-343, December.
- E. Dekel & D. Fudenberg, 2010.
"Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
379, David K. Levine.
- Martin Dufwenberg & Mark Stegeman, 2002. "Existence and Uniqueness of Maximal Reductions Under Iterated Strict Dominance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 2007-2023, September.
- Asheim, Geir B. & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2000.
"Amissibility and Common Belief,"
Research Papers in Economics
2000:6, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
- Robert J. Aumann, 2010.
"Correlated Equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian Rationality,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
661465000000000377, David K. Levine.
- Aumann, Robert J, 1987. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 1-18, January.
- R. Aumann, 2010. "Correlated Equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian Rationality," Levine's Bibliography 513, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Chen, Yi-Chun & Long, Ngo Van & Luo, Xiao, 2007.
"Iterated strict dominance in general games,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 299-315, November.
- Adam Brandenburger & Amanda Friedenberg & H. Jerome Keisler, 2008.
"Admissibility in Games,"
Econometric Society, vol. 76(2), pages 307-352, 03.
- Samuelson, Larry, 1992. "Dominated strategies and common knowledge," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 284-313, April.
- Robin P. Cubitt & Robert Sugden, 2008.
"Common reasoning in games,"
2008-01, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Cubitt, Robin P. & Sugden, Robert, 2003. "Common Knowledge, Salience And Convention: A Reconstruction Of David Lewis' Game Theory," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 19(02), pages 175-210, October.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:not:notcdx:2009-16. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Suzanne Robey)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.