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Amissibility and Common Belief

  • Asheim, Geir B.

    ()

    (Department of Economics ,University of Oslo)

  • Dufwenberg, Martin

    (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University)

The concept of ‘fully permissible sets ’ is defined by an algorithm that eliminate strategy subset . It is characterized as choice sets when there is common certain belief of the event that each player prefer one strategy to another if and only if the former weakly dominate the latter on the sets of all opponent strategie or on the union of the choice sets that are deemed possible for the opponent. the concept refines the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure and captures aspects of forward induction.

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Paper provided by Stockholm University, Department of Economics in its series Research Papers in Economics with number 2000:6.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 29 Feb 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:2000_0006
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Department of Economics, Stockholm, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden

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Fax: +46 8 16 14 25
Web page: http://www.ne.su.se/
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  1. E. Dekel & D. Fudenberg, 2010. "Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty," Levine's Working Paper Archive 379, David K. Levine.
  2. Epstein, Larry G & Wang, Tan, 1996. ""Beliefs about Beliefs" without Probabilities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1343-73, November.
  3. Tan, Tommy Chin-Chiu & da Costa Werlang, Sergio Ribeiro, 1988. "The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 370-391, August.
  4. Samuelson, L., 1990. "Dominated Strategies And Common Knowledge," Working papers 90-14, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  5. Geir B. Asheim, 2000. "Proper Consistency," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0193, Econometric Society.
  6. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July.
  7. Samuelson, Larry, 1992. "Dominated strategies and common knowledge," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 284-313, April.
  8. T. Börgers, 2010. "Weak Dominance and Approximate Common Knowledge," Levine's Working Paper Archive 378, David K. Levine.
  9. Elchanan Ben-Porath, 1997. "Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect-Information Games," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 64(1), pages 23-46.
  10. Basu, K. & Weibull, J.W., 1990. "Strategy Subsets Closed Under Rational Behaviour," Papers 479, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  11. Asheim,G.B., 1999. "On the epistemic foundation for backward induction," Memorandum 30/1999, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  12. Lawrence Blume & Adam Brandenburger & Eddie Dekel, 2014. "Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice Under Uncertainty," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Language of Game Theory Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games, chapter 6, pages 137-160 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  13. van Damme,Eric, 1987. "Stable equilibria and forward induction," Discussion Paper Serie A 128, University of Bonn, Germany.
  14. Christian Ewerhart, 1998. "Rationality and the definition of consistent pairs," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(1), pages 49-59.
  15. Asheim,G.B. & Dufwenberg,M., 2000. "Deductive reasoning in extensive games," Memorandum 08/2000, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  16. Geir B. Asheim, 2002. "Proper rationalizability in lexicographic beliefs," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 30(4), pages 453-478.
  17. D. B. Bernheim, 2010. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Levine's Working Paper Archive 514, David K. Levine.
  18. Rajan, Uday, 1998. "Trembles in the Bayesian Foundations of Solution Concepts of Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 248-266, September.
  19. Hurkens, Sjaak, 1996. "Multi-sided Pre-play Communication by Burning Money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 186-197, April.
  20. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1996. "Strategic Rationality Orderings and the Best Rationalization Principle," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 178-200, April.
  21. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1997. "On Rationalizability in Extensive Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 40-61, May.
  22. Blume, Lawrence & Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1991. "Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 81-98, January.
  23. Borgers, Tilman & Samuelson, Larry, 1992. ""Cautious" Utility Maximization and Iterated Weak Dominance," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 21(1), pages 13-25.
  24. Epstein, Larry G., 1997. "Preference, Rationalizability and Equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 1-29, March.
  25. Marco Mariotti, 1997. "Decisions in games: why there should be a special exemption from Bayesian rationality," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(1), pages 43-60.
  26. Brandenburger Adam & Dekel Eddie, 1993. "Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 189-198, February.
  27. P. Battigalli & M. Siniscalchi, 1999. "Interactive Beliefs and Forward Induction," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 99f3, Economics Department, Princeton University.
  28. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2002. "Strong Belief and Forward Induction Reasoning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 356-391, October.
  29. Asheim, Geir B. & Perea, Andres, 2005. "Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 15-42, October.
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