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Amissibility and Common Belief

  • Asheim, Geir B.

    ()

    (Department of Economics ,University of Oslo)

  • Dufwenberg, Martin

    (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University)

The concept of ‘fully permissible sets ’ is defined by an algorithm that eliminate strategy subset . It is characterized as choice sets when there is common certain belief of the event that each player prefer one strategy to another if and only if the former weakly dominate the latter on the sets of all opponent strategie or on the union of the choice sets that are deemed possible for the opponent. the concept refines the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure and captures aspects of forward induction.

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Paper provided by Stockholm University, Department of Economics in its series Research Papers in Economics with number 2000:6.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 29 Feb 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:2000_0006
Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, Stockholm, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone: +46 8 16 20 00
Fax: +46 8 16 14 25
Web page: http://www.ne.su.se/
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  1. E. Dekel & D. Fudenberg, 2010. "Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty," Levine's Working Paper Archive 379, David K. Levine.
  2. Borgers Tilman, 1994. "Weak Dominance and Approximate Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 265-276, October.
  3. Rajan, Uday, 1998. "Trembles in the Bayesian Foundations of Solution Concepts of Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 248-266, September.
  4. Samuelson, L., 1989. "Dominated Strategies And Common Knowledge," Papers 1-89-3, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  5. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2002. "Strong Belief and Forward Induction Reasoning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 356-391, October.
  6. Asheim,G.B., 1999. "Proper consistency," Memorandum 31/1999, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  7. D. B. Bernheim, 2010. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Levine's Working Paper Archive 514, David K. Levine.
  8. Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa & Chin-Chiu Tan, Tommy, 1987. "The Bayesian Foundations of Solution Concepts of Games," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 111, FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
  9. Borgers, Tilman & Samuelson, Larry, 1992. ""Cautious" Utility Maximization and Iterated Weak Dominance," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 13-25.
  10. Asheim, Geir B, 2000. "Deductive reasoning in Extensive Games," Research Papers in Economics 2000:7, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
  11. van Damme,Eric, 1987. "Stable equilibria and forward induction," Discussion Paper Serie A 128, University of Bonn, Germany.
  12. Asheim,G.B., 1999. "On the epistemic foundation for backward induction," Memorandum 30/1999, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  13. Marco Mariotti, 1997. "Decisions in games: why there should be a special exemption from Bayesian rationality," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(1), pages 43-60.
  14. Basu, Kaushik & Weibull, Jorgen W., 1991. "Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 141-146, June.
  15. Battigalli, P. & Siniscalchi, M., 1999. "Interactive Beliefs and Forward Induction," Economics Working Papers eco99/15, European University Institute.
  16. Samuelson, Larry, 1992. "Dominated strategies and common knowledge," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 284-313, April.
  17. Epstein, Larry G & Wang, Tan, 1996. ""Beliefs about Beliefs" without Probabilities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1343-73, November.
  18. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1996. "Strategic Rationality Orderings and the Best Rationalization Principle," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 178-200, April.
  19. Hurkens, S., 1993. "Multi-Sided Pre-Play Communication By Burning Money," Papers 9319, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  20. Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 1997. "Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect-Information Games," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(1), pages 23-46, January.
  21. Asheim, Geir B. & Perea, Andres, 2005. "Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 15-42, October.
  22. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July.
  23. Geir B. Asheim, 2002. "Proper rationalizability in lexicographic beliefs," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 453-478.
  24. Brandenburger Adam & Dekel Eddie, 1993. "Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 189-198, February.
  25. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1997. "On Rationalizability in Extensive Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 40-61, May.
  26. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154422 is not listed on IDEAS
  27. Epstein, Larry G., 1997. "Preference, Rationalizability and Equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 1-29, March.
  28. Christian Ewerhart, 1998. "Rationality and the definition of consistent pairs," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 49-59.
  29. Blume, Lawrence & Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1991. "Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 81-98, January.
  30. Blume, Lawrence & Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1991. "Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 61-79, January.
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