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Proper consistency

  • Asheim,G.B.

    (University of Oslo, Department of Economics)

Proper consistency is defined by the properties that each player takes all opponent strategies into account (is cautious) and deems one opponent strategy to be infinitely more likely than another if the opponent prefers the one to the other (respects preferences). When there is common certain belief of proper consistency, a most preferred strategy is properly rationalizable. Any strategy used with positive probability in a proper equilibrium is properly rationalizable. Only strategies that lead to the backward induction outcome is properly rationalizable in the strategic form of a generic perfect information game. Proper rationalizability can be used to test the robustness of inductive procedures.

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File URL: http://www.sv.uio.no/econ/english/research/unpublished-works/working-papers/pdf-files/1999/Memo-31-1999.pdf
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Paper provided by Oslo University, Department of Economics in its series Memorandum with number 31/1999.

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Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:1999_031
Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Phone: 22 85 51 27
Fax: 22 85 50 35
Web page: http://www.oekonomi.uio.no/indexe.html
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  1. Mailath, George J & Samuelson, Larry & Swinkels, Jeroen M, 1993. "Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(2), pages 273-302, March.
  2. Aumann, Robert J., 1995. "Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 6-19.
  3. Blume, Lawrence & Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1991. "Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 81-98, January.
  4. Adam Brandenburger & Eddie Dekel, 2014. "Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Language of Game Theory Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games, chapter 2, pages 31-41 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  5. Battigalli, P. & Siniscalchi, M., 1999. "Interactive Beliefs and Forward Induction," Economics Working Papers eco99/15, European University Institute.
  6. Herings, P.J.J. & Vannetelbosch, V., 1997. "Refinements of Rationalizability for Normal-Form Games," Discussion Paper 1997-03, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  7. Epstein, Larry G & Wang, Tan, 1996. ""Beliefs about Beliefs" without Probabilities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1343-73, November.
  8. Drew Fudenberg & Eddie Dekel, 1987. "Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty," Working papers 471, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  9. Borgers Tilman, 1994. "Weak Dominance and Approximate Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 265-276, October.
  10. Stalnaker, Robert, 1998. "Belief revision in games: forward and backward induction1," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 31-56, July.
  11. Asheim,G.B., 1999. "On the epistemic foundation for backward induction," Memorandum 30/1999, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  12. Blume, Lawrence & Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1991. "Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 61-79, January.
  13. Asheim,G.B. & Dufwenberg,M., 2000. "Admissibility and common belief," Memorandum 07/2000, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  14. Epstein, Larry G., 1997. "Preference, Rationalizability and Equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 1-29, March.
  15. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1991. "Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 909-24, July.
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