Dynamic Interactive Epistemology
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- Board, Oliver, 2004. "Dynamic interactive epistemology," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 49-80, October.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Johan Van Benthem & Eric Pacuit & Olivier Roy, 2011. "Toward a Theory of Play: A Logical Perspective on Games and Interaction," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 2(1), pages 1-35, February.
- repec:pit:wpaper:244 is not listed on IDEAS
- Giacomo Bonanno & Cédric Dégremont, 2013.
"Logic and Game Theory,"
Working Papers
135, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Giacomo Bonanno & Cédric Dégremont, 2013. "Logic and Game Theory," Working Papers 134, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Giacomo Bonanno & Cédric Dégremont, 2013. "Logic and Game Theory," Working Papers 136, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Billot, Antoine & Vergnaud, Jean-Christophe & Walliser, Bernard, 2015.
"Multiagent belief revision,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 47-57.
- Antoine Billot & Jean-Christophe Vergnaud & Bernard Walliser, 2015. "Multiagent belief revision," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01387542, HAL.
- Antoine Billot & Jean-Christophe Vergnaud & Bernard Walliser, 2015. "Multiagent belief revision," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01175921, HAL.
- Guilhem Lecouteux, 2017. "Bayesian Game Theorists and Non-Bayesian Players," GREDEG Working Papers 2017-30, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis.
- Giacomo Bonanno, 2004.
"A simple modal logic for belief revision,"
Working Papers
45, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Giacomo Bonanno, 2005. "A simple modal logic for belief revision," Working Papers 517, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Amedeo Fossati, 2014. "The Luigi Einaudi vs. Mauro Fasiani epistemological debate (1938-1943): the end of the italian tradition in Public Finance," STUDI ECONOMICI, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2014(113), pages 5-33.
- Guilhem Lecouteux, 2017. "Bayesian Game Theorists and non-Bayesian Players," Working Papers halshs-01633126, HAL.
- Giacomo Bonanno, 2011.
"Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games,"
Working Papers
1111, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Giacomo Bonanno, 2014. "Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games," Working Papers 149, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Giacomo Bonanno, 2013. "Counterfactuals and the Prisoner?s Dilemma," Working Papers 137, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- repec:hal:journl:halshs-00344461 is not listed on IDEAS
- Giacomo Bonanno, 2007. "Four Logics for Minimal Belief Revision," Working Papers 76, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
More about this item
Keywords
interactive epistemology; belief revision; semantic; syntactic;JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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