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Temporal interaction of information and belief

  • Giacomo Bonanno

    (Department of Economics, University of California Davis)

The temporal updating of an agent’s beliefs in response to a flow of information is modeled in a simple modal logic that, for every date t , contains a normal belief operator B_t and a non-normal information operator I_t which is analogous to the ‘only knowing’ operator discussed in the computer science literature. Soundness and completeness of the logic are proved and the relationship between the proposed logic and the AGM theory of belief revision is discussed.

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File URL: http://wp.econ.ucdavis.edu/05-41.pdf
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Paper provided by University of California, Davis, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 541.

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Length: 22
Date of creation: 27 Dec 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:05-41
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  1. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1996. "Strategic Independence and Perfect Bayesian Equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 201-234, July.
  2. E. Ray Canterbery, 1984. "Introduction," Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 7(1), pages 4-6, October.
  3. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 236-260, April.
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