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Algorithmic Characterization of Rationalizability in Extensive Form Games

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  • Oliver Board

Abstract

We construct a dynamic epistemic model for extensive form games, which generates a hierarchy of beliefs for each player over her opponents` strategies and beliefs, and tells us how those beliefs will be revised as the game proceeds. We use the model to analyze the implications of the assumption that the players possess common (true) belief in rationality, thus extending the concept of rationalizability to extensive form games.

Suggested Citation

  • Oliver Board, 2003. "Algorithmic Characterization of Rationalizability in Extensive Form Games," Economics Series Working Papers 148, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:148
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    File URL: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/materials/papers/2121/paper148.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Board, Oliver, 2004. "Dynamic interactive epistemology," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 49-80, October.
    2. Adam Brandenburger, 2007. "The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(4), pages 465-492, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    rationalizability; extensive form games; belief revision;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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