Recent Results On Belief, Knowledge And The Epistemic Foundations Of Game Theory
We provide a self-contained, selective overview of the literature on the role of knowledge and beliefs in game theory. We focus on recent results on the epistemic foundations of solution concepts, including correlated equilibrium, rationalizability in dynamic games, forward and backward induction.
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- Pierpaolo Battigalli & Marciano Siniscalchi, 1999.
"An Epistemic Characterisation of Extensive Form Rationalisability,"
1999.25, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 1997. "An Epistemic Characterization of Extensive Form Rationalizability," Working Papers 1009, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- D. B. Bernheim, 2010.
"Rationalizable Strategic Behavior,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
514, David K. Levine.
- Battigalli, P. & Bonanno, G., 1993. "Synchronic Information and Common Knowledge in Extensive Games," Papers 93-11, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs.
- Balkenborg, Dieter & Eyal Winter, 1995.
"A Necessary and Sufficient Epistemic Condition for Playing Backward Induction,"
Discussion Paper Serie B
331, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Balkenborg, Dieter & Winter, Eyal, 1997. "A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 325-345, April.
- Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 1999.
"Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 188-230, September.
- Pierpaolo Battigalli, . "Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games," Working Papers 111, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Lismont, Luc & Mongin, Philippe, 1995.
"Belief closure: A semantics of common knowledge for modal propositional logic,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 127-153, October.
- Lismont L. & Mongin, P., 1996. "Belief closure: A semantics of common knowledge for modal propositional logic," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 60-60, February.
- LISMONT, Luc & MONGIN, Philippe, 1993. "Belief Closure : A Semantics of Common Knowledge for Modal Propositional Logic," CORE Discussion Papers 1993039, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Giacomo Bonanno & Pierpaolo Battigalli, 2004.
"The Logic Of Belief Persistency,"
9518, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Robert Aumann & Adam Brandenburger, 2014.
"Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium,"
World Scientific Book Chapters,
in: The Language of Game Theory Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games, chapter 5, pages 113-136
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Elchanan Ben-Porath, 1997. "Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect-Information Games," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 64(1), pages 23-46.
- Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1997. "On Rationalizability in Extensive Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 40-61, May.
- Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 1999. "Interactive beliefs, epistemic independence and strong rationalizability," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 247-273, September.
- Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1996. "Strategic Independence and Perfect Bayesian Equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 201-234, July.
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