Memory and perfect recall in extensive games
No abstract is available for this item.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Joseph Y. Halpern, 2000.
"Characterizing the Common Prior Assumption,"
Game Theory and Information
- Piccione, Michele & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1997.
"On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 3-24, July.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1995. "On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 324-324, December.
- van Benthem, Johan, 2001. "Games in Dynamic-Epistemic Logic," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(4), pages 219-48, October.
- Ritzberger, Klaus, 2002. "Foundations of Non-Cooperative Game Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199247868, June.
- E. Ray Canterbery, 1984. "Introduction," Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 7(1), pages 4-6, October.
- Klaus Ritzberger, 1999. "Recall in extensive form games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 28(1), pages 69-87.
- Jude Kline, J., 2002. "Minimum Memory for Equivalence between Ex Ante Optimality and Time-Consistency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 278-305, February.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:47:y:2004:i:2:p:237-256. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.