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Inductive Game Theory: A Basic Scenario

  • Mamoru Kaneko

    ()

    (Institute of Policy and Planning Sciences, University of Tsukuba)

  • J. Jude Kline

    ()

    (Department of Economics, School of Business, Bond University)

The aim of this paper is to present the new theory called “inductive game theory”. A paper, published by one of the present authors with A. Matsui, discussed some part of inductive game theory in a specific game. Here, we will give a more developed discourse of the theory. The paper is written to show one entire picture of the theory: From individual raw experiences, short-term memories to long-term memories, inductive derivation of individual views, classification of such views, decision making or modification of behavior based on a view, and repercussion from the modified play in the objective game. We focus on some clear-cut cases, forgetting a lot of possible variants, but will still give a lot of results. In order to show one possible discourse as a whole, we will ask the question of how Nash equilibrium is emerging from the viewpoint of inductive game theory, and will give one answer.

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Paper provided by Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan in its series IEAS Working Paper : academic research with number 06-A001.

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Length: 57 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:sin:wpaper:06-a001
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  1. Kaneko, Mamoru & Matsui, Akihiko, 1999. " Inductive Game Theory: Discrimination and Prejudices," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 1(1), pages 101-37.
  2. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, June.
  3. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, June.
  4. Nobu-Yuki Suzuki & Mamoru Kaneko, 2002. "Bounded interpersonal inferences and decision making," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 63-103.
  5. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1993. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 523-45, May.
  6. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
  7. Dubey, Pradeep & Kaneko, Mamoru, 1984. "Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games: 1," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 111-139, October.
  8. Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, 1992. "Case-Based Decision Theory," Discussion Papers 994, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  9. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1231-40, September.
  10. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1995. "On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 324-324, December.
  11. Ritzberger, Klaus, 2002. "Foundations of Non-Cooperative Game Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199247868, March.
  12. Mamoru Kaneko, 2002. "Epistemic logics and their game theoretic applications: Introduction," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 7-62.
  13. Brandenburger Adam & Dekel Eddie, 1993. "Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 189-198, February.
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