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The Right to Remain Silent


  • Joseph Greenberg



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Suggested Citation

  • Joseph Greenberg, 2000. "The Right to Remain Silent," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 193-204, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:48:y:2000:i:2:p:193-204
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1005205630723

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Lo, Kin Chung, 1996. "Equilibrium in Beliefs under Uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 443-484, November.
    2. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1993. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 523-545, May.
    3. Ebbe Hendon & Hans Jorgen Jacobsen & Birgitte Sloth & Torben Tranaes, 1995. "NASH Equilibrium in Lower Probabilities," Discussion Papers 95-09, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    4. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1991. "Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 909-924, July.
    5. Ebbe Groes & Hans Jørgen Jacobsen & Birgitte Sloth & Torben Tranaes, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium with Lower Probabilities," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 37-66, January.
    6. Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M., 1995. "Learning in extensive-form games I. Self-confirming equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 20-55.
    7. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1231-1240, September.
    8. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Frank Riedel & Linda Sass, 2014. "Ellsberg games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 76(4), pages 469-509, April.
    2. Dufwenberg, Martin & Servátka, Maroš & Vadovič, Radovan, 2017. "Honesty and informal agreements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 269-285.
    3. Joseph Greenberg & Sudheer Gupta & Xiao Luo, 2003. "Towering over Babel: Worlds Apart but Acting Together," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 03-A009, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
    4. Lo, Kin Chung, 2007. "Sharing beliefs about actions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 123-133, March.
    5. Decerf, Benoit & Riedel, Frank, 2016. "Disambiguation of Ellsberg equilibria in 2x2 normal form games," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 554, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    6. Lo, Kin Chung, 2009. "Correlated Nash equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 722-743, March.
    7. Muraviev, Igor & Riedel, Frank & Sass, Linda, 2017. "Kuhn’s Theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 26-41.
    8. Sass, Linda, 2014. "Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Form Ellsberg Games," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 478, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.


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