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Non-additive anonymous games

  • Roman Kozhan


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Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 40 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 215-230

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:40:y:2011:i:2:p:215-230
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  1. Green, Edward J, 1984. "Continuum and Finite-Player Noncooperative Models of Competition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 975-93, July.
  2. Mukerji, S., 1995. "Understanding the nonadditive probability decision model," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9517, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  3. Kin Chung Lo, 1995. "Equilibrium in Beliefs Under Uncertainty," Working Papers ecpap-95-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  4. Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-153, April.
  5. Ghirardato, Paolo & Le Breton, Michel, 2000. "Choquet Rationality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 277-285, February.
  6. HART, Sergiu & HILDENBRAND, Werner & KOHLBERG, Elon, . "On equilibrium allocations as distributions on the commodity space," CORE Discussion Papers RP 183, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  7. Marinacci, Massimo, 2000. "Ambiguous Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 191-219, May.
  8. Paul Milgrom & Robert Weber, 1981. "Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 428R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  9. Jürgen Eichberger & David Kelsey, 2004. "Sequential Two-Player Games With Ambiguity," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(4), pages 1229-1261, November.
  10. Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 571-87, May.
  11. ZHOU, Lin, 1996. "Integral Representation of Continuous Comonotonically Additive Functionals," CORE Discussion Papers 1996005, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  12. Mukerji, S. & Song Shin, H., 1997. "Equilibrium Departures From Common Knowledge in Games With Non-Additive Expected Utility," Economics Papers 137, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  13. Dow James & Werlang Sergio Ribeiro Da Costa, 1994. "Nash Equilibrium under Knightian Uncertainty: Breaking Down Backward Induction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 305-324, December.
  14. Khan, M. Ali & Sun, Yeneng, 1995. "Extremal structures and symmetric equilibria with countable actions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 239-248.
  15. Kajii, Atsushi & Morris, Stephen, 1998. "Payoff Continuity in Incomplete Information Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 267-276, September.
  16. Eichberger, Jurgen & Kelsey, David, 2000. "Non-Additive Beliefs and Strategic Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 183-215, February.
  17. Aliprantis, Charalambos D. & Glycopantis, Dionysius & Puzzello, Daniela, 2006. "The joint continuity of the expected payoff functions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 121-130, April.
  18. Marinacci, Massimo, 1999. "Limit Laws for Non-additive Probabilities and Their Frequentist Interpretation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 145-195, February.
  19. Roman Kozhan & Michael Zarichnyi, 2008. "Nash equilibria for games in capacities," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 321-331, May.
  20. Ebbe Hendon & Hans Jorgen Jacobsen & Birgitte Sloth & Torben Tranaes, 1995. "NASH Equilibrium in Lower Probabilities," Discussion Papers 95-09, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  21. Rath, Kali P. & Yeneng Sun & Shinji Yamashige, 1995. "The nonexistence of symmetric equilibria in anonymous games with compact action spaces," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 331-346.
  22. Ryan, Matthew J., 2002. "Violations of Belief Persistence in Dempster-Shafer Equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 167-174, April.
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