IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/joecth/v57y2014i1p1-40.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Trembles in extensive games with ambiguity averse players

Author

Listed:
  • Gaurab Aryal
  • Ronald Stauber

Abstract

We introduce and analyze three definitions of equilibrium for finite extensive games with imperfect information and ambiguity averse players. In a setting where players’ preferences are represented by maxmin expected utility, as characterized in Gilboa and Schmeidler (J Math Econ 18(2):141–153, 1989 ), our definitions capture the intuition that players may consider the possibility of slight arbitrary mistakes. This generalizes the idea leading to trembling-hand perfect equilibrium as introduced in Selten (Int J Game Theory 4(1):25–55, 1975 ), by allowing for ambiguous trembles characterized by sets of distributions. We prove existence for two of our equilibrium notions and relate our definitions to standard equilibrium concepts with expected utility maximizing players. Our analysis shows that ambiguity aversion can lead to behavioral implications that are distinct from those attained under expected utility maximization, even if ambiguous beliefs only arise from the possibility of slight mistakes in the implementation of unambiguous strategies. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Gaurab Aryal & Ronald Stauber, 2014. "Trembles in extensive games with ambiguity averse players," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 57(1), pages 1-40, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:57:y:2014:i:1:p:1-40
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-014-0828-9
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-014-0828-9
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s00199-014-0828-9?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Riedel, Frank & Sass, Linda, 2016. "The strategic use of ambiguity," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 452, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    2. Bade, Sophie, 2011. "Ambiguous act equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 246-260, March.
    3. Aryal, Gaurab & Stauber, Ronald, 2014. "A note on Kuhn’s Theorem with ambiguity averse players," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(1), pages 110-114.
    4. , & , & ,, 2006. "Optimal auctions with ambiguity," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(4), pages 411-438, December.
    5. Bose, Subir & Daripa, Arup, 2009. "A dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 2084-2114, September.
    6. Gilboa Itzhak & Schmeidler David, 1993. "Updating Ambiguous Beliefs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 33-49, February.
    7. Lo, Kin Chung, 1999. "Extensive Form Games with Uncertainty Averse Players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 256-270, August.
    8. Jürgen Eichberger & David Kelsey, 2011. "Are the treasures of game theory ambiguous?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 48(2), pages 313-339, October.
    9. Gajdos, T. & Hayashi, T. & Tallon, J.-M. & Vergnaud, J.-C., 2008. "Attitude toward imprecise information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 27-65, May.
    10. Ronald Stauber, 2014. "A framework for robustness to ambiguity of higher-order beliefs," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(3), pages 525-550, August.
    11. Dow James & Werlang Sergio Ribeiro Da Costa, 1994. "Nash Equilibrium under Knightian Uncertainty: Breaking Down Backward Induction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 305-324, December.
    12. ,, 2011. "Dynamic choice under ambiguity," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(3), September.
    13. Atsushi Kajii & Takashi Ui, 2005. "Incomplete Information Games With Multiple Priors," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 56(3), pages 332-351, September.
    14. Azrieli, Yaron & Teper, Roee, 2011. "Uncertainty aversion and equilibrium existence in games with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 310-317.
    15. Thomas Jungbauer & Klaus Ritzberger, 2011. "Strategic games beyond expected utility," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 48(2), pages 377-398, October.
    16. Hendon, Ebbe & Jacobsen, Hans Jorgen & Sloth, Birgitte, 1996. "The One-Shot-Deviation Principle for Sequential Rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 274-282, February.
    17. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, December.
    18. Muraviev, Igor & Riedel, Frank & Sass, Linda, 2017. "Kuhn’s Theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 26-41.
    19. Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-153, April.
    20. Lo, Kin Chung, 1996. "Equilibrium in Beliefs under Uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 443-484, November.
    21. Nishimura, Kiyohiko G. & Ozaki, Hiroyuki, 2004. "Search and Knightian uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 119(2), pages 299-333, December.
    22. R. H. Strotz, 1955. "Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 23(3), pages 165-180.
    23. , & ,, 2007. "Updating preferences with multiple priors," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(3), September.
    24. Epstein, Larry G. & Schneider, Martin, 2003. "Recursive multiple-priors," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 1-31, November.
    25. Roman Kozhan & Michael Zarichnyi, 2008. "Nash equilibria for games in capacities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 35(2), pages 321-331, May.
    26. Eichberger, Jurgen & Kelsey, David, 2000. "Non-Additive Beliefs and Strategic Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 183-215, February.
    27. Stauber, Ronald, 2011. "Knightian games and robustness to ambiguity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 248-274, January.
    28. Dionysius Glycopantis & Allan Muir, 2008. "Nash equilibria with Knightian uncertainty; the case of capacities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(1), pages 147-159, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Baillon, Aurélien & Bleichrodt, Han & Li, Chen & Wakker, Peter P., 2021. "Belief hedges: Measuring ambiguity for all events and all models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    2. Aryal, Gaurab & Stauber, Ronald, 2014. "A note on Kuhn’s Theorem with ambiguity averse players," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(1), pages 110-114.
    3. Stauber, Ronald, 2017. "Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 409-432.
    4. Luciano I. Castro & Zhiwei Liu & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2017. "Ambiguous implementation: the partition model," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 63(1), pages 233-261, January.
    5. de Castro, Luciano I. & Liu, Zhiwei & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2017. "Implementation under ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 20-33.
    6. Sass, Linda, 2014. "Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Form Ellsberg Games," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 478, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    7. Igor Kopylov, 2016. "Subjective probability, confidence, and Bayesian updating," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 62(4), pages 635-658, October.
    8. Stauber, Ronald, 2019. "A strategic product for belief functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 38-64.
    9. Ronald Stauber, 2019. "A strategic product for belief functions," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2019-668, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
    10. Xiao Luo & Xuewen Qian & Yang Sun, 2021. "The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(2), pages 579-601, March.
    11. Benoit Decerf & Frank Riedel, 2020. "Purification and disambiguation of Ellsberg equilibria," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(3), pages 595-636, April.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Stauber, Ronald, 2017. "Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 409-432.
    2. Muraviev, Igor & Riedel, Frank & Sass, Linda, 2017. "Kuhn’s Theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 26-41.
    3. Eran Hanany & Peter Klibanoff & Sujoy Mukerji, 2020. "Incomplete Information Games with Ambiguity Averse Players," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(2), pages 135-187, May.
    4. Pahlke, Marieke, 2022. "Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 85-108.
    5. Ellis, Andrew, 2018. "On dynamic consistency in ambiguous games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 241-249.
    6. Dorian Beauchêne, 2016. "Solution concepts for games with ambiguous payoffs," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 80(2), pages 245-269, February.
    7. Frank Riedel & Linda Sass, 2014. "Ellsberg games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 76(4), pages 469-509, April.
    8. Lang, Matthias & Wambach, Achim, 2013. "The fog of fraud – Mitigating fraud by strategic ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 255-275.
    9. Frank Riedel, 2017. "Uncertain Acts in Games," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 34(4), pages 275-292, December.
    10. Bade, Sophie, 2022. "Dynamic semi-consistency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 117-126.
    11. Pahlke, Marieke, 2018. "Dynamic Consistency in Incomplete Information Games with Multiple Priors," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 599, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    12. Yang, Jian, 2018. "Game-theoretic modeling of players’ ambiguities on external factors," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 31-56.
    13. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Simone Cerreia-Vioglio & Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci, 2015. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium and Model Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(2), pages 646-677, February.
    14. Karni, Edi & Maccheroni, Fabio & Marinacci, Massimo, 2015. "Ambiguity and Nonexpected Utility," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    15. Ronald Stauber, 2019. "A strategic product for belief functions," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2019-668, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
    16. Stauber, Ronald, 2019. "A strategic product for belief functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 38-64.
    17. Aryal, Gaurab & Stauber, Ronald, 2014. "A note on Kuhn’s Theorem with ambiguity averse players," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(1), pages 110-114.
    18. Jürgen Eichberger & Simon Grant & David Kelsey, 2017. "Ambiguity and the Centipede Game: Strategic Uncertainty in Multi-Stage Games," Discussion Papers 1705, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
    19. Beauchêne, Dorian & Li, Jian & Li, Ming, 2019. "Ambiguous persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 312-365.
    20. Georgalos, Konstantinos, 2021. "Dynamic decision making under ambiguity: An experimental investigation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 28-46.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Extensive games; Ambiguity; Maxmin; C72; D81;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:57:y:2014:i:1:p:1-40. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.