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Ambiguity and the Centipede Game: Strategic Uncertainty in Multi-Stage Games

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  • Eichberger, Jürgen
  • Grant, Simon
  • Kelsey, David

Abstract

We propose a solution concept for a class of extensive form games with ambiguity. Specifically we consider multi-stage games. Players have CEU preferences. The associated ambiguous beliefs are revised by Generalized Bayesian Updating. We assume individuals take account of possible changes in their preferences by using consistent planning. We show that if there is ambiguity in the centipede game it is possible to sustain 'cooperation' for many periods as part of a consistent-planning equilibrium under ambiguity. In a non-cooperative bargaining game we show that ambiguity may be a cause of delay in bargaining.

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  • Eichberger, Jürgen & Grant, Simon & Kelsey, David, 2017. "Ambiguity and the Centipede Game: Strategic Uncertainty in Multi-Stage Games," Working Papers 0638, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:awi:wpaper:0638
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    Cited by:

    1. Paolo Crosetto & Marco Mantovani, 2018. "Representation effects in the centipede game," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 13(10), pages 1-13, October.
    2. Battigalli, P. & Catonini, E. & Lanzani, G. & Marinacci, M., 2019. "Ambiguity attitudes and self-confirming equilibrium in sequential games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 1-29.
    3. Galanis, S. & Ioannou, C. & Kotronis, S., 2019. "Information Aggregation Under Ambiguity: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 20/05, Department of Economics, City University London.

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    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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