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Strategic games beyond expected utility

  • Thomas Jungbauer

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  • Klaus Ritzberger

    ()

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-011-0638-2
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    Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

    Volume (Year): 48 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 2 (October)
    Pages: 377-398

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:48:y:2011:i:2:p:377-398
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    1. Eichberger, Jurgen & Kelsey, David, 2000. "Non-Additive Beliefs and Strategic Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 183-215, February.
    2. Eichberger, Jürgen & Kelsey, David, 2008. "Are the Treasures of Game Theory Ambiguous?," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 08-08, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
    3. Dionysius Glycopantis & Allan Muir, 2008. "Nash equilibria with Knightian uncertainty; the case of capacities," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 147-159, October.
    4. Ebbe Hendon & Hans Jorgen Jacobsen & Birgitte Sloth & Torben Tranaes, 1995. "NASH Equilibrium in Lower Probabilities," Discussion Papers 95-09, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    5. Walker, Mark, 1979. "A Generalization of the Maximum Theorem," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 20(1), pages 267-72, February.
    6. Matthew J. Ryan, 2002. "What do uncertainty-averse decision-makers believe?," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 47-65.
    7. Ben Polak, 1999. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium, and Common Knowledge of Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(3), pages 673-676, May.
    8. Machina,Mark & Schmeidler,David, 1991. "A more robust definition of subjective probability," Discussion Paper Serie A 365, University of Bonn, Germany.
    9. Chateauneuf, Alain & Eichberger, Jurgen & Grant, Simon, 2007. "Choice under uncertainty with the best and worst in mind: Neo-additive capacities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 538-567, November.
    10. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July.
    11. Lo, Kin Chung, 1996. "Equilibrium in Beliefs under Uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 443-484, November.
    12. Roman Kozhan & Michael Zarichnyi, 2008. "Nash equilibria for games in capacities," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 321-331, May.
    13. Jurgen Eichberger & David Kelsey, 2006. "Optimism and Pessimism in Games," Discussion Papers 0605, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
    14. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-28, July.
    15. Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 571-87, May.
    16. Quiggin, John, 1982. "A theory of anticipated utility," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 323-343, December.
    17. Aumann, Robert & Brandenburger, Adam, 1995. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1161-80, September.
    18. Crawford, Vincent P., 1990. "Equilibrium without independence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 127-154, February.
    19. Marinacci, Massimo, 2000. "Ambiguous Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 191-219, May.
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